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IN T R O D U C T IO N
The two great classical philosophical theories of knowledge 
- rationalism and empiricism - bring with them not only diff­
erent conceptions of knowledge, but also different understandings 
of the acquisition of knowledge. They also involve different 
conceptions of mind, at any rate to the extent that for empir­
icism the mind is, as Locke put it, like a mirror which passively 
receives reflections from without; while for rationalism the 
mind is more active, being involved in its own operations:
With the development of psychology as an empirically orientated 
science, accounts of learning inspired by the empiricist ways 
of thinking have become the accepted thing. Charles Taylor 
(The Explanation of Behaviour, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1964: p. 143) has noted that stimulus - response (S - R) theory 
can be construed as "a mechanistic transposition of the trad­
itional empiricists views of epistemology".
In relation to the practice of education, behaviourists 
theories of learning have been the most widely used as can be 
seen by reference to the well-known writers on the psychology 
of school learning, for example Gagne", De Cecc.a, . Lunzer and 
Lovell» (The appendix will explain why all these writers must 
be considered as falling within the behaviourist school)»
Further within education, the best known approach to curriculum 
planning - the behavioural objectives model - has made great 
use of behaviouristic models in attaining objectives.
Theories of learning inspired by the rationalist tradition 
have received very little attention within psychology. The 
.most straightforward claim for a rationalist account of learning
i i
has been made by Chomsky, with his now well known defence of 
the doctrine of innate ideas. Chomsky's claim regarding the 
notion of innate ideas has been, of course, made in the context 
of language acquisition.
Chomsky rejects the tabual rasa empiricist account and 
his particular point seems to be that the child could not 
abstract the notion of language from the data available to 
him. In language and Mind (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1968, 
p. 74) Chomsky speaks about the problems involved in the idea 
of the grammar of a language being discovered by the child 
"from the data presented to him"; the point being that the 
idea of language itself with its deep structure could not be 
so discovered. Therefore as Chomsky sees it the only alter« 
native to empiricism is rationalism.
However, as Behaviourist theories of learning inspired 
by empiricism have been the most popular in relation to school 
learning, this thesis will focus mainly on such theories. Further 
it will be the main purpose of the thesis to suggest that the 
behaviourist view which has achieved the most prominence in the 
past is of fundamental little relevance to the teacher; and if 
the study of school learning is going to be more meaningfully 
relevant to the teacher, it must concentrate more on the approach 
pioneered by such psychologists as Piaget and Bruner, This 
approach rejects the empiricist /, behaviourist view, but does 
not like Chomsky, see rationalism as the only alternative to 
empiricism. Rather they attempt what David Hamlyn calls " a 
Putative reconciliation between empiricism and rationalism".
(D. V/. Hamlyn, "Human Learning", in R. S. Peters (Ed.) The
Philosophy of Education: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 181).
1The Conception of Learning in Behaviourism
1. Behaviourism
Behaviourism as a conception of psychology is generally 
regarded as being originated by U. S. psychologist John B. Watson 
in 19131 , It' holds its subject-matter to be the objectively 
observable actions of organisms. The organism is seen as 
"responding" to conditions (stimuli) set by the outer environment 
and inner biological processes. Earlier psychologies which had 
conceived of psychology as a science of consciousness were to be 
discarded and Behaviourism in the words of Watson,
attempted to make a fresh, clean start in psychology 
breaking both with current theories and with traditional 
concepts and terminology . (2)
The movement initiated by Watson was to have a considerable 
influence on modern psychology and social science and on man1s 
conception of himself.
As a movement it can only be properly understood in its 
historical context. It is, therefore, important to examine 
briefly its immediate origins. Its development in the context 
of the early 20th century can be linked to two immediate origins 
- partly as a reaction against introspectionist psychology and 
partly as a consequence of the success which was being attained 
in the study of animals at this time.^
CHAPTER 1
2Immediate Origins of Behaviourism
The first experimental psychological laboratory of modern
4history was set up by William Wundt in West Germany in 1879.
Wundt set about analysing the mind and perceptions, mainly 
through the technique of careful self - observation or intro- 
spectiono
'According to Wundt, the subject matter of. psychology 
was restricted to the immediate phenomena of conscious 
experience, and the approach to follow in studying 
these phenomena was one that would afford direct contact 
with experience. (5)
However, its influence was shortlived as notoriously inconsistent 
reports were being obtained by well trained introspectionists 
in different laboratories. It thus became evident that some 
of the operations of mind were, in the most exasperating manner, 
just out of view of the prying eye of inward reflection. The • 
inescapable implication, according to Watson, was that such a 
methodological approach to psychology was unacceptable. Mental 
events were no longer to be the proper objects for psychologists 
to study. Instead, the focus was to be on behaviour. Subjective 
reports stemming from introspective analysis was disclaimed in 
favour of objective behavioural measures.
As an alternative to the techniques of introspectionism 
Watson proposed thaiTthe techniques that were then being so 
successful in animal research be adopted. In animal research 
consciousness could be eliminated and objective behaviour could 
be studied. Behaviour is real and practical and thus according
3to Watson should form the basis of a new scientific psychology. 
Horton and Turnage write:
As an alternative to the techniques of introspective 
psychology, Watson proposed a strictly objective 
psychology in which human and animal behavior were 
to receive equal emphasis and in which neither mental 
states nor introspective reports had any place. Watson 
proposed to define psychology as a science of behavior 
whose orientation centered upon procedure for investi­
gating the conditions that influence human behavior- (6)
V/atson himself stated:
•You will find, then the Behaviorist working like any 
other scientist. His sole object is to gather facts 
about - verify his data - subject them both to logic 
and mathematics (the tools of every scientist) (7)
Therefore V/atson proposed, that psychology in the interest of 
'scientific1 precision, should become a science of behaviour, 
and, for a while at least, man became mindless in the eyes of 
the behaviourist.
Animal Studies
The particular animal studies that influenced the rise of 
behaviourism must be examined. The most significant works 
were those of Ivan P. Pavlov and E. R. Thorndike. As will be 
seen later the theoretical and empirical contributions of 
Pavlov and Thorndike were to have a profound influence on the 
development of behaviourism in the early 20th century. 
Incidentally neither of these pioneers in animal learning were 
actually part of the behaviourist movement. Pavlov was a 
physiologist and Thorndike's initial work, on animal learning 
predated the formal rise of behaviourism.
4Classical conditioning is associated v/ith such incidents 
as Pavlov teaching a dog to salivate at the ringing of a bell; 
it is stimulus substitution. In a typical experiment a dog 
was strapped in a test frame, with elaborate experimental 
controls, and a bell (conditioned stimulus) was repeatedly 
sounded before food (unconditioned stimulus) was placed in 
the mouth to produce salivation (unconditioned response), 
until eventually the sound of the bell brought about salivation
g
(conditioned response) before the presentation of food. This 
is the typical classical conditioning experiment whereby a 
conditioned response is associated with, or evoked by, a new 
- conditioned - stimulus.
Thorndike's Connectionism
Thorndike's work was particularly influential from the 
point of view of the rise of behaviourism, in that he was 
the first to introduce cats, dogs, chickens and monkeys into 
the psychological laboratory and carried out experiments upon 
them to determine how they learn.
Thorndike's theory of learning is called S - R bond theory 
or connectionism. It implies that through conditioning, 
specific responses become to be linked with specific stimuli. 
These links, bonds, or connections are products or biological, 
that is, synaptic changes in',nervous system. Thorndike thought 
that the principle way in which S - H connections are formed 
is through random trial and error learning,.
P a v l o v  a n d  T h e  C o n d i t i o n e d  R e f l e x
In a typical trial and error experiment a "hungry" animal 
is placed in a cage with food visible on the outside, and the 
door of the cage can be opened by pulling a chord hanging 
within reach of the animal outside the cage. After a trial 
and error process the animal opens the door and thereby obtains 
the food. On subsequent attempts the animal takes shorter 
periods of time through elimination of unnecessary movements. 
Thorndike inferred from the timed behaviour of his cats that 
learning was a process of "stamping in" connections in the
nervous system and had nothing to do with insight or catching
9 ’ on. o
He believed that there were two basic laws that could explain 
this process. He placed considerable importance upon reinforce­
ment.
A response is strengthened if it is followed by pleasure 
and weakened if followed by displeasure. In Thorndike's words,
(to) a modifiable connection being made ... between an 
S and an R and being accompanied or followed by a 
satisfying state of affairs responds, other things being 
equal, by an increase in the strength of that connection.
To a connection similar, save that an annoying state of 
affairs goes with or follows it, man responds, other 
things being equal, by a decrease in the strength of the 
connection . (10)
This is his Law of Effect and is his primary law. His second 
law - The Law of Exercise - states simply that S - R connections 
are strengthened by the response occurring in the presence of 
the stimulus» As Thorndike put it,
"Other things being equal, exercise strengthens the bond 
between situation and response". (11)
6Though Watson was initially unaware of Pavlov's work, 
however, he gradually incorporated it into his theory once he 
became familiar with it. Thus as Hilgard states,
-Watson used the Pavlov experiment as the paradigm of 
learning, and made of the conditioned reflex the unit 
of habit, building his whole system eventually on that 
foundation. (12)
Mind and all kinds of mentalistic concepts were not only 
unsusceptible to scientific enquiry but also irrelevant to 
the real task of psychology. In line with this way of thinking 
Watson and other "pure" behaviourists came to reject certain 
of Thorndike's ideas because it seemed impossible to exclude 
mind and mind related concepts from thefiri. In particular to 
such behaviourists concepts of satisfaction and annoyance as
included in Thorndike's law of Effect seemed mentalistic, which
could not be included in a truly scientific psychology. So 
Watson confined his study to only those aspects of animal life, 
that are sufficiently overt to make possible highly objective
observation and measurement of them.
Thus Watson in rejecting every mentalistic account, explains 
learning in terms of such physiological mechanisms as reflexes. 
Mind is thereby eliminated. The common-sense dualism of mind 
and body is reduced to monism of body alone. John S. Brubacker 
writing about behaviourism and the elimination of mind states:
Behaviorism is the best instance of this theory, where, 
as already noted, psychologists and educators base their 
knowledge of human nature strictly on an observation of 
overt physical behavior. Mental phenomena have not 
standing except as their muscular correlates . (13)
W a t s o n s  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  L e a r n i n g
Watson and others in the classical behaviourist mould know
7that other events intervene between stimulus and response.
But in order to maintain a coherent and systematic position, 
Hilgard states,
... these intervening events are .posited to be much like 
like the observed'ones, that is, implicit or covert S - R 
sequences. (14)
Thought, for instance, therefore, is merely implicit speech, 
that is, talking to onself, Sensitive enough instruments could 
detect tongue or other movement accompaniments of thinking.
In this way the behaviourist can hold to his consistent behav­
iourist position without denying that thinking goes on.
This view of learning is not only materialistic but mechan­
ical as well. Learning being a matter of association or forming 
connections between stimulus and response. Connections are 
formed, habits are stamped in, largely by mere repetition.
Unlike the case where the mind is an entity and initiator of 
responses in behaviourism the response waits to go into.action 
until it receives the appropriate stimulus. All human learning 
is reactivity.
This connectionist/associationist view of learning was not 
particularly original to behaviourism, being derived from the 
philosophical work of British philosophers (Locke, Berkeley, 
Hume, Mills and Hartley) in 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. 
Popular acceptability of the notion of association, within 
philosophy at this time, was related to progress in the physical 
sciences. The physical universe had been shown to consist of 
a limited number of chemical elements that can combine in
8innumerable ways. By analogy a science of mental chemistry 
became appealing. Ideas were the basic elements in this new 
science which became organised in the mind through association. 
Particular emphasis was placed upon the way simple ideas could 
be combined to form more complex ideas. Morris L. Bigge writes;
•For Locke, ideas were the units of the mind, and 
associations consisted of combinations of ideas.
Ideas were either simple or complex. One of the 
operations of the mind was thought to be a com“- 
pounding of complek ideas from simple ones . (15)
Psychologists came to accept the notion of associationism. 
Y/atson and other classical behaviourists applied Pavlov's 
conceptions to human learning. And experimental psychology
16became dominated by the search for the laws of association.
2. Neobehaviourism
While Watson popularized the behaviourist philosophy in 
the early 20th century x it was not, however, until the early 
1930's that the psychology of learning became almost synonymous 
with conditioning. A neobehaviourist movement developed at 
this time, and some of the original assumptions of Watson were 
modified. Nevertheless, the central methodological doctrine 
about the sort of evidence on which a scientific psychology 
should be based remained as did the general preference for 
conditioning princles in explaining learning.
However, while within neobehaviourism one thinks of all 
learning as S - E conditioning, conditioning is divided into 
basic categories; classical or pavlovian conditioning - that
9without reinforcement and operant or instrumental conditioning 
- that which occurs through reinforcement.
Instrumental conditioning with its emphasis on reinforce­
ment can be understood as the development of the work of 
Thorndike, particularly the law of effect (Hilgard 1 9 7 5 ) .  In 
neobehaviourism a more precise specification of the law is 
formulated. One direction of theory that represented a some­
what more precise statement of reinforcement was proposed by 
Hull ( 1 9 4 3 )  and also Spence ( 1 9 5 6 ) ,  Miller ( 1 9 5 9 )  and Skinner 
( 1 9 6 9 ) 1 8 .
Despite disagreements concerning the role of reinforcement 
as well as other learning principles, these theorists were in 
substantial accord regarding the central importance of classical 
and instrumental principles in explaining learning. This 
agreement on the importance of conditioning principles, regard­
less of persuasion on other matters, is clearly exemplified
19in the position taken by B. F» Skinner . Skinner maintained 
that too much emphasis on theorizing was misguided and for him 
the approach was simply to discover the conditions that produce 
and control learned behaviour. He based his system almost 
exclusively on the principles of operant conditioning.
As for the general concept of learning, the emphasis on 
psychology as a science of behaviour clearly implied that 
mantalistic terms and concepts were to be avoided. It is most 
surprising to find that learning was defined as
... a change in performance which occurs under the 
conditions of practice .20
1 0
The term learning thereby was to mean little more than
objective publicly observable performance. There was fairly
general agreement that associations between stimuli and responses
constituted what the organism learned, and complicated behaviours
such as problem - solving or transfer to new situations were
presumably the result of combining associations that had been
21acquired previously by the organism.
The theoretical conception of learning within behaviourist 
psychology as a process of S - R conditioning has been examined. 
The relevance of such a view of learning for the teacher will 
be assessed in this dissertation. However, rather than attempt 
this immediately it will be useful to examine the underlying 
philosophical rationale of behaviourism. Any psychological 
system rests upon a particular view of basic human nature.
The kind of assumptions of human nature taken will inevitably1 
determine the kind of answers obtained by the psychologists.
Donald Arnstine in discussing the findings of different approaches 
to the study of learning, in his book The Philosophy of Education, 
writes;
If we may trust that all empirical investigations are 
confronted with the same range (i.e., visible, audible, 
etc.) of events in a world common to them all, then we 
may suppose that the differences in events they select 
for study and the differences in the inferences they 
make on the basis of often quite similar sets of events, 
are differences in the assumptions they have made 
(consciously or not) about the nature of reality with 
which they are dealing. In the present instance, the 
reality in question is that of the nature of man, or of 
mind. The assumptions in turn can be traced back to 
philosophical world views that have for several millenia 
dominated Western culture . (22)
1 1
The main task of the following discussion will be to show 
that the behaviourist view of human learning, which is derived 
from the realist philosophical outlook, is an inadequate theory 
principally because of the shortcomings of the philosophical 
world view on which it is based. It is not that we
■find correct and incorrect philosophies the way we find 
mistakes in mathematical proofs . (22)
Yet we can show that some philosophies, at least, no longer
work when they are carried from academic theorizing to the
complexity of practical affairs. As these kinds of affairs -
in the ■present context . conceptions of education and an
'educated' person - are now much more clearly understood than
they were when the philosophical assumptions underlying behaviour-
24ism were developed«
The next section will, therefore, examine the philosophical 
assumptions of behaviourism.. It will also focus upon how its 
theoretical assumptions have influenced a very important view 
of curriculum planning, that is, the behavioural objectives 
model of curriculum planning.
3. Behaviourism, Theoretical Assumptions and Educational 
Application.
The behaviourist view of man as a passive or reactive 
orgnism that is the product of an unique S - R history in a 
determining environment, embraces the allied philosophical 
doctrine of metaphysical and epistemological realism **.
Realism understood in its broadest philosophical sense, 
connotes any view, that accords to the objects of man's 
knowledge an independence of whether he is thinking about or 
perceiving them. Thus, an essential or ultimate reality exists 
independent of man. Furthermore, even if there were no human 
beings around to observe it, it would exist in the same sense. 
This according to Brubacker is a common-sense philosophical 
view of the world, in that the denial of the external world 
would be regarded as too absurd to be contemplated.
One very important group of educational realists are the
scientific realists or the; contemporary logical empiricists
27- the current representatives of the scientific realists 
The fundamental assumption lying behind most educational research 
is that the object of research has a definite external physical 
reality. Within the scientific realist outlook, science is 1 
concerned with the discovery of pre-existent laws, which govern 
the world about us. Knowledge of these laws enhances predict­
ability, and thereby control, of the variables that cause events 
to occur. This is as true in psychology as in physics or 
chemistry. Thus, through the discovery of these laws the human 
being gains control over the naturalistic world.
In attempting to describe this reality the educational 
researcher must necessarily adopt objective scientific methods. 
Mystical concepts of subjective consciousness are therefore 
irrelevant. Bigge writes;
To a consistent logical empiricist, nothing should be 
asserted to be real or meaningful unless, through
1 2
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observation, it can be subjected to objective study, using 
only publicly verifiable data. If anything exists, it 
exists in some amount, if it exists in some amount, it 
can be measured. (28)
Thus, to an educational realist mind must be ignored. If a 
subjective concept of mind is included in human research, human 
nature will continue to be an enigma. Thus,realists adopt a 
mechanical view of human nature, reducing mind to matter, in 
the interests of an objective scientific study, and accordingly 
objective scientific measuring techniques are available to the 
researcher.
Thus scientific realistic philosophy is implicit in the 
behaviourism that was developed by Watson, and continued to 
be accepted by those who followed him. Morris L. Bigge writes;
Realist, mechanistic psychology, then, has been an out­
growth of the attempt of S - R conditioning theorists to 
make psychology as "scientific" as physics. Thus, S - R 
theorists have equated stimulus and response in psychology 
with cause and effect in physics-. (290
This is seen clearly in the writings of contemporary neobehav­
iourist B. P. Skinner. To Skinner human behaviour is the subject 
of a scientific psychology. Human behaviour can be analysed 
mechanically like physical concepts. Accordingly he states,
Man is a machine, but a very complex one. At present he
is beyond the powers of men to construct - except, of
course, in the usual biological way. (30)
Skinner maintains that the laws that govern this machine can
be determined and thus man's behaviour can be controlled. He
writes;
We are concerned, then, with the causes of human behavior.
14
We want to know why men behave as they do. Any condition 
or event which can be shown to have an effect upon 
behaviour must be taken into account. By discovering and 
analyzing these causes, we can predict behavior, to the 
extent that we can manipulate them, we can conrol them . (31
Thus the behaviourists in harmony with the scientific realists 
see the human as a cleverly designed machine. A passive mech-A ■ 
anical view of man determined by the environment is postulated. 
Such a view of man paves the way for the scientific measurement 
and evaluation of man's behaviour.
Educational Application
This conception of man is essentially the same view of man
that is implied in the movement to make a scientific deter-
32mmation of educational objectives.
What a community values is held to be an objective fact.
As such, it should be as susceptible to investigation and 
definition as any other object of scientific research. And once 
given the authenticity of science - to most minds - incontestable 
- it becomes invested with the spirit of essentialism. The 
social and cultured tradition stands for external reality as 
it is best known to-date.
The principal concern of the curriculum is to examine things 
as they are in themselves. The pupil comes to know the essential 
nature of things and can apprehend what is ultimately real and 
immutable. He experiences are given shape by what is ultimately 
real. George Kneller writes,
..o since in the realist view the world exists independ­
ently of man the school should transmit a cultural core 
of subject matter that will acquaint the pupil with the 
v/orld around it . (33)
15
Objectives can be determined from this external world. And
in maintaining consistency with the scientific realist position,
those v/ho have operationalized the objectives view of curriculum
planning, have adopted an ’engineering' model within which to
explain the curriculum process. Such a model, it is argued,
provides a scientific/rational approach to the curriculum-^,
in that it systematically identifies the key elements in
curriculum planning, namely objectives, content, learning
experiences and evaluation. The essence of this model approach
to curriculum planning can be seen in the basic model offered







The value of the model, according to Kerr, is that it suggests 
four basic questions for the use in the construction of a new 
curriculum. These questions have been identified by Ralph Tyler, 
a well-known advocate of this view of curriculum planning.
1. What educational purposes should the school seek to attain?
2. What educational experiences can be provided that are likely 
to attain these purposes?
3. How can these educational experiences be effectively organized?
4. How can we determine whether these purposes are being 
attained? (36)
The comprehensiveness of these questions systematically 
isolates all the relevant factors in curriculum construction. 
Thus a scientific approach is called for.
However, in the overall.according to Kerr,
"the really important questions are about objectives''. (37)
The objectives component of the model is the logical starting 
point. Furthermore,
the most useful form for starting objectives is to express 
them in terms which identify both the kind of behaviour 
to be developed in the student and the content or area of 
life in which this behaviour is to operate . (38)
This is the classic understanding of objective control of all 
the major proponents of this concept of curriculum planning, 
for example, Mager, Tyler, Bloom and Taba. The behavioural 
objective provides the essentail objectivity in curriculum 
planning as does the concept of behaviour in behavioristic
—  "3 Qpsychology. R. M. Gagne, a behaviouristic psychologist , who 
has taken a keen interest in this approach to curriculum plan­
ing, writing about the value of the behavioural objective states
'We ... frequently encounter such terms as ’’knowledge", 
"understanding", "appreciation", and others of this 
sort which seem to have the purpose of identifying 
learned capabilities or dispositions. Mager (1962)
... (has) pointed out the ambiguity of such terms, and 
the unreliability of communications in which they are 
used ... there appears to me to be no alternative to 
the use of the behavioural objective .fo (40)
The behavioural objective provides the essential objectivity 
necessary for precise evaluation. Bloom puts clearly the role 
of evaluation in the behavioural objectives model;
17
The - criterion of determining the quality of a school and 
its educational functions would he the extent to which it 
achieves the objectives it has set for itself our
experiences suggest that unless the school has translated 
the objectives into specific and operational definitions, 
little is likely to be done about the objectives . (4-1)
Evaluation of success, it is claimed, through measuring precise 
objectives, is scientific. The rigour of the scientifically 
constructed test provides the best way forward in curriculum 
design and theory. The planning of a curriculum must be 
dominated by the ways in which we test whether children have 
changed their behaviours in the way desired.
Therefore, behavioural curriculum theory derived from 
similar theoretical assumptions and with its emphasis upon 
observable behaviour, followed similar methodological lines 
as behaviourism. In this manner curriculum construction theory 
accepted the sufficiency of realist epistemology and the 
behavioural science belief that because observables are the 
only human phenomenon open to scientific methods of investigation, 
we can, therefore, build adequate curriculum theories on this 
scientific rationalism.
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The Behaviouristic Conception of Learning and Educational 
Theory and Practice.
This chapter proposes to examine the educational value of 
the behaviouristic view of learning as outlined in the previous 
chapter. It will be suggested that it is inadequate as a view 
of school learning, and three major approaches in criticism will 
be taken;
(i) that the conception of learning in behaviourism is 
too 'broad' for educational purposes.
(ii) that there are important questions in relation to 
school learning for example logical questions, which 
are ignored in the behaviourist account.
(iii) that the assumptions of behavouristic learning theory, 
as applied to education through the behavioural 
objectives model of curriculum planning, do not provide 
a satisfactory account of the curriculum process.
1. The Concept of Learning
It is a common place assertion that schools are places where 
pupils learn, or where they are supposed to learn. Rut no matter 
how universal agreement may be to this innocent-appearing 
statement, there is very little precision about what it means. 
Indeed, Hugh Sockett has remarked about the concept of learning;
No concept has been more badly treated by those who trade 
in definitions. It deserves considerable attention, (l)
Before any specialized enquiry can proceed very far, some
precision in key concepts is important. In looking for such
precision one is asking basic philosophical questions about
2the meaning of terms, in this instance about learning.
CHAPTER 2
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Questions, for instance, about what learning is and what is 
implied when it is said someone has learnt something. As 
D. W. Hamlyn writes,
To answer such questions we have to clarify the concepts 
which we employ in this sphere, something that requires 
both reflection and fimiliarity with the subject to which 
these concepts apply . (3)
Investigations of this kind, which Gilbert Ryle^ calls 'mapping 
the logical geography1 of a concept, are not
"so much a matter for the psychologist as for the 
philosopher". (5)
In attempting to gain some precision in the concept, a 
useful way to proceed will be by looking at the 'behaviourist* 
definition of 'learning'. E. R. Hilgard offers the following 
definition;
■Learning is a process by which an activity originates o r , 
is changed through reaction to an encountered situation, 
provided that the characteristics of the change in activity 
cannot be explained on the basis of native response 
tendencies, maturation, or temporary states of the organism 
(e.g., fatigue, drugs, etc.) .(6)
Thus learning is seen as any permanent modification of behaviour 
as a result of prior experience. This is a very broad concept­
ion of learning. There are innumerable processes through which 
behaviour may be changed but not all of these processes can 
properly be called learning. Take an example offered by Sockett,
.... on this definition of learning, we can learn true or 
false beliefs. That is, if someone believes that 'oil is 
blood of buried dinosaurs', a manifestly false belief, then 
he can be said to have learnt it. But how could he learn 
something that is false? (7)
2 0
It could not be said that such a person learned anything, 
though he could acquire such a false belief through some brain­
washing technique. While the behaviourist for experimental 
purposes would consider this a case of learning, it would be 
grossly misleading and confusing in an educational context.
Thus a more sophisticated account is required. A number
of philosophers, for example Ryle^, Peters^, Hirst‘S ,  Hamlyn^,
12 1 ^Longford , Sockett , have attempted to provide a more educat­
ionally acceptable view of the concept. R. S. Peters, for 
example, offers a definition representative of this view;
Learning, as distinct from maturation, involves coming 
up to the mark according to different criteria involved 
in these achievments, as a result of experience'. (14)
This view is important in that it states, that it is not correct 
to say of someone whose behaviour or belief has changed, that 
he has learned anything unless he has achieved a success. Further 
the criteria of success are not inherent in the concept of 
learning itself, but laid down by the nature of what it is that 
has to be learned*
It is not, necessarily, that the behaviourist in his
experimental work is uninterested in criteria of success, but
that he tends to apply them arbitrarily, and therefore, to
15distract attention from their importance A behaviourist 
may set about to train a pigeon to go about with its head 
stretched in the air in an unnatural way. The pigeon's behaviour 
is 'shaped' by rewarding successive approximations to the 
required behaviour, until it takes the form which the experi­
mentalist wanted it to take. In so far as the pigeon has
learned anything it has learned something determined arbit­
rarily by the experimentalist. And in any event
the psychologist's concern is not so much with what is 
learned as with the way in which it is learned ......  (16)
But in school learning the situation is different. The 
teacher cannot decide arbitrarily upon the criterion of success. 
They are internal to the matter to be learned. Thus, to take 
an example from Glen Langford;
•... in learning arithmetic success counts in the most 
modest case, in being able to provide the answer 'four' 
to the sum of two and two. 'Five' just won't do, any' 
more than 'Rome* is acceptable as the answer to the 
question 'V/hat is the capital of France ?' «.. the teacher 
... is governed by impersonal criteria of success . (17)
Thus learning cannot be considered apart from the object of 
learning. It is quite uninformative of someone to say that 
he is learning, without saying v/hat, it is he is learning. Just 
to say 'he is learning’ is incomprehensible without an object.
One i.s, therefore, learning a particular X. And to have 
learnt, is always to have come up to a particular standard; 
for example to know what one did not previously know , or to
" i  Q
have mastered a particular skill. Further, for somebody 
to learn X they must pay attention to particular features of 
the X, rather than to other features of the environment. For 
example, R. S. Peters writes,
It would be unintelligble, for instance, that a person 
could attain a mastery of Euclid by just standing on his 
head - unless, that is a special story was told about the
connection between adopting this position and grasping 
relationships between angles straight lines, etc. For, 
if Euclid is to be understood, there must be experiences 
in which attention is paid to features of figures such 
as triangles and squares. (1$)
Two important implications arise from this account of learning. 
(Sockett 1976).
First, if the relevant criteria of success are inherent
in the nature of the subject of learning, then in the case of
beliefs these standards or criteria can only be the standards
of truth. It is essential to the nature of beliefs that beliefs
20can-either be true or false* But we would not be prepared
to grant a certificate of success to someone who had acquired
a false belief. The essence of it being that one cannot
21logically learn something knowing it to be false*
i
Secondly, if a person is to learn anything, he must pay 
attention to the features of what he is learning, and these 
features then become the standards or criteria of success.
There are important empirical questions about the 
relevant conditions that should be established in the class­
room in order to facilitate learning. But a teacher can only 
control these conditions* Ee cannot make somebody learn;
the individual must see what the standards are and come up to
22them, that implies his voluntariness. For example, Peters
writes in connection with the learning of a moral principle;
... if the teacher is trying to get the learner to grasp 
a principle, all he can do is to draw his attention
23
to common features of cases and hope that the penny will 
drop'. (23)
It is central, therefore, to the notion of learning that it 
involves an achievement and this achievement must be the result 
of the person's own efforts.
This raises an important point in relation to the charact­
erization of'learning as a process. Hilgard's definition begins, 
'learning is a process ...., but, in conclusion to this section, 
it will be argued that on the basis of what has been said about 
learning thus for, it would be misleading to regard it as a 
process, (or to put it another way , that 'learning' is the 
name of a process)while on the other hand conditioning could be 
regarded as a process.
Conditioning is a process whereby something happens to some­
one, but learning is more a case of someone doing something than 
something happening to someone. (Langford 1969). The force of 
this point can be illustrated by being clear about the meaning 
of a process, and this can be done by applying the notion of a
process where it most obviously belongs, that is, to physical 
24objects. A piece of wood may be processed, for example, by 
turning it on a lathe; the process involved might be called 
'turning'. This illustrates the meaning of a process it is 
something that happens to something in order to change it. 
Similarly conditioning can be seen as a process of something 
happening to someone. For example the pigeon in the experiment 
quoted earlier or in the following example of human conditioning. 
In a psychological laboratory a student is enabled ?to obtain
voluntary control of what is for most persons an involuntary 
reflex'. (25)
In one experiment of this nature, the pupil of a man's 
eye was trained to contract on command. In the first 
stage of training, a bell was rung immediately before 
a light was shone in his eyes. After some trials, the 
sound of the bell alone would cause his pupils to con-v 
tract . (26)
This experiment went through further stages which need not 
concern us in this context.
This and the example of the pigeon are clearly cases of some­
thing happening to someone and thus, the logic of applying 
the label ^ process" to conditioning. However, as the concept 
of learning has been sketched in the previous pages, it has 
been suggested that it is more of a case of a person doing 
something. As Godfrey Vesey writes;
V/hatever one does, in learning to do something, must itself 
really be something one does,something in which one is 
actively engaged. It cannot be simply something which 
happens to one. But, 'being conditioned' is precisely not 
something one does. It is something which is done to one 
- either by oneself or, as is usually the case, by some­
one else . (27)
The passive view of learning in behaviourism as something done 
to an organism from the outside, does not embrace all the 
essential characteristics of the concept, especially as they 
would apply to education, Michael Oakeshott writes;
By learning I mean an activity possible only to an intwlli 
gence capable of choice and self - direction in relation 
to his own impulses and the world around him. These, of 
course, are pre-eminently human characteristics, and, as 
I understand, only human beings are capable of learning.
2i?
A learner is not a passive recipient of impressions, or 
one whose accomplishments spring from more reactions to 
circumstances, or one who attempts nothing he does not 
know how to accomplish. He is a creature of wants rather 
than of needs, of recollection as well as of memory; he 
wants to know what to think and what to believe and not 
merely what to do (28)
This is not to suggest that the learner is always active and 
his attention is always focused upon understanding and being 
able to explain, or that nothing can be learned which is not 
understood; nor is it meant that human beings are uniquely 
predestined learners whatever their circumstances. But that 
an activity, like education, that may include understanding 
and being able to explain within its range is different in 
its scale of achievements from one in which this possibility 
is denied.
This will be considered fruther in the final section of 
this chapter - in considering educational aims and values, it
I#will be suggested that; psychology that emphasizes the mastery 
of techniques at the expense of the ultimate values of education 
is of doubtful value to the teacher. And also in the following 
chapter, the view of man as a passive actor who merely responds 
to the external environment will be discussed. Evidence will 
be brought from various scources, which will suggest, that man 
may himself actively participate in his own conceptual con­
struction of the world. But first a further philosophical 
matter in relation to the concept of learning must be examined.
2. Logical and Psychological Aspects of Learning
Apart from the conceptual/philosophical analysis of the
concept of learning sketched in the previous section, there 
are also further and important philosophical questions that 
bear upon the concept of learning. . Questions particularly 
about the proper sequencing of material in a curriculum. That 
these are philosophical questions has not always been recog­
nized within behaviourist psychology or even within psychology 
generally.
,\Ar-f'The point being;within the context of what is being taught, 
there must be certain related elements of knowledge such that 
the possession of one necessarily presupposes the possession 
of others. For example, presumably a child must understand 
the concept of number before it can understand the concept of 
plus and minus. D. W. Hamlyn writes;
That this must be so is indicated by the existence of 
general principles for the establishment of curricula, 
and if it were not so any suggestion that programmes 
could be laid down for teaching machines would be 
impossible". (29)
That is not a particularly spectacular claim. However, 
psychologists have failed to recognize the essential philo­
sophical nature of such questions. For example. R. M. Gagne, 
a contemporary ‘eclectic1 behaviourist, writing an article 
entitled,"Curriculum Research and the Promotion of Learning", 
states;
The appropriate sequencing of units of content (of a 
curriculum) can be based on empirical evidence. It
doesn't have to be a matter of speculation about what
the students are capable of learning, on the one hand,
nor a matter of elegance of logical derivation, on the
other. The pedagogical correctness of a sequence of
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content units can be tested by successively applied 
trials of what students can actually achieve . (30)
Such a view has been challenged by for example, Hirst^
32 33Hamlyn , and Sockett ,who argue that such a task is philo­
sophical and not psychological or empirical as suggested by 
Gagne, for two main reasons.
Firstly, while there are areas in which there will be little 
to choose between different sequences on logical grounds, 
how could such a sequence be outlined initially without reference 
to the logical structure of the unit? Secondly, if a unit is 
determined in the first place on logical grounds, it does not 
therefore require empirical evidence to verify it.
How can something which is supposed to be a necessary 
truth be discovered by empirical investigations? (34)
Therefore the impression that in ordering the content of a 
curriculum a teacher is simply working on psychological grounds 
cannot be correct. The logic of the unit, the demands made 
by the content, must be respectedj indeed they will form the 
basis on which such units are devised. Now just what are 
the logical preconditions and just what are the contingent 
matters is open to enquiry. Perhaps sitting down in one's 
armchair to plan units of this kind is a sensible way of trying 
to tease out what the logical questions are. But this is not 
doing psychology.
There is a striking absence of philosophical work in this 
area which may tend to make the point obvious. Because it is
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not an extraordinary claim that certain aspects of learning 
are necessary preconditions to more advanced learnings. More 
significantly, however, is the point that in the construction 
of a curriculum, where knowledge is at stake, very complex and 
highly important logical and epistemological questions are of 
paramount significance: and D. W. Hamlyn writes:
Now, I think that there are priorities in learning which 
are more than psychological, and they might be described 
as epistemological, or logical ... In the growth of 
knowledge, certain things must be done before the others. 
... The appreciation of certain subjects demands a certain 
order of knowledge' ... YYhat I am saying is that such 
principles of order, could be established only by decisions 
on what is the appropriate order for the development of 
knowledge and understanding of a subject. To reach such 
decisions demands that very knowledge and understanding 
of the subject itself, plus a willingness to reflect upon 
the exact relationships between the concepts presupposed 
within it. This is not a matter for psychology. I would 
emphasize the point . (35)
This is something that has not always been recognized in applying 
psychological findings to education. V/hat has been said, amongst 
other things, is that it is a necessity for proper reflection on 
what such concepts as learning and education mean, and what they 
involve in consequence. Because, only in this way can we rid 
ourselves of misleading models which may inhibit our understanding 
of such concepts.
3. The Behavioural Objectives Model and Curriculum Planning.
The emphasis on objectives has undoubtedly highlighted the 
fact that educational courses have been taught and examined 
without the benefit of clear and unambiguous goals. Using as 
a primary criterio.n for selecting objectives that they be
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... statements of ways in which the knowledge, cognitive 
abilities, skills, interests, values and attitudes of ^  
students should change if the curriculum is effective ,
is a very important addition to curriculum thinking. The 
absence of such statements has led in part to the poor quality 
of teaching and instruction; broad and vague generalizations 
about the aims of education have contributed little to the 
development of the ideas such generalizations contained.
D. Hogben in an article entitled "The Behavioural Objectives 
Approach : Some Problems and Some Dangers" presents some of 
the arguments for behavioural objectives. The two major 
advantages are that:
1. they provide clear cut ends or goals towards which 
which students can work
2. because of their focus on terminal performance 
expressed in terms of observable behavior (exactly 
what the student should be able to do), they 
facilitate the measurement and evaluation of 
curriculum outcomes(37)
Hogben remarks:
These are certainly attractive advantages. If the educator 
has clear unambiguous statements of curriculum intent 
before him, then the planning of instruction and the teaching 
and the measurement of student performance becomes much 
more straightforward . (38)
However the move towards the specification of objectives has 
not taken place without its critics. Lawrence Stenhouse states:
"The objectives model of curriculum design and planning is 
no doubt a useful one, but it has severe limitations". (39)
While Hogben has remarked:
"While this (behavioural objectives) approach has some very
30
attractive features, its apparent simplicity and 
logicality conceals some very real hazards for the 
teacher and evaluator . (40)
It is proposed to examine some of these 'limitations' ana 
'hazards' of the behavioural approach. The intention being 
that such an examination will highlight some of the short­
comings of behaviouristic psychology, especially as applied 
to education, since the behavioural objectives approach has 
made great use of behaviouristic models in attaining objectives.
The behavioural objectives model will be critized on two main
grounds, firstly that it is too precise and specific and,
secondly, that, through the adoption of a scientific stance
it avoids any philosophical discussion regarding questions of
41educational aims and values.
A. S-pecification of Objectives.
In specifying in detail the objectives of the curriculum 
one is likely to have certain influences upon the quality of 
actual teaching and learning. The objectives view adopts a 
very tight view of what should be happening in the classroom.
The teacher must be working towards a particular objective 
at any given time. This presumes that if the teacher states 
his objective in advance he will be able to predict accurately 
what the outcome of instruction will be. According to 
Professor E. Eisner, however,
... the outcomes of instruction are far more numerous
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and complex for educational objectives to encompass. The 
amount type and quality of learning that occurs in a 
classroom, expecially when there is interaction among 
students are only in a small part predictable . (42)
Teaching, then, as Eisner sees it, is dynamic rather than 
mechanistic in character.
In the very process of teaching and discussing unexpected 
opportunities emerge for making a valuable point,
for demonstrating an interesting idea and for teaching a 
significant concept . (4.3)
It is this dynamic and complex character of teaching which 
makes the outcomes of this activity
"far too numerous to be specified in behavioural and 
content terms in advance". 44
Thus the classroom does not readily lend itself to a mechanical 
view of teaching.
By eliminating the dynamic character of teaching one then1 
regards teaching as a stable mechanistic process. J. M. Atkin 
has criticized the 'human engineering1 approach to education 
and highlighted some of its side effects.
If identification of all worthwhile outcomes in behavioural 
terms comes to be commonly accepted and expected, then it 
is inevitalbe that, over time, the curriculum will tend to 
emphasize those elements which have been thus identified. 
Important outcomes which are detected only 'with great 
difficulty and which are translated only rarely into 
behavioural terms tend to atrophy. They disappear from 
the curriculum because we spend all our time allotted to 
us in teaching explicitly for the more readily specifiable 
learnings to which we have been directed. (45)
There is another aspect to this line of criticism which is 
very fundamental. It takes the form that is based on a view 
of education as an open-ended continuous process to which the
allocation of specific terminal objectives is inappropriate. 
Seeing the ends of education in terms of precise and observable 
changes in pupils behaviour which can be measured, raises a 
number of problems.
In the first, place, the result of one's teaching may not be 
immediately obvious, it may take a long time to produce results. 
Denis Lawton takes up this particular point, and for example 
he states,
....I read some of Shelley's poetry at school, when I was 
16, which I did not really appreciate until I read some 
Plato some years later .... ('46.)
This illustrates that teaching may take a long time to produce 
results. It also illustrates that it is a mistake to think 
one can specifically predict what the pupil will get out of any 
particular learning experience. John Holt writes,
In the last year or two I have done some work with other 
citizens in my home town of Boston to defeat or at least 
delay a bad or crooked so-called urban - development 
scheme. From this I have learned much about the law, 
politics, and economics of the city, and about the work­
ings of the state and city governments. But I did not go 
into the work to learn all this, but to try to prevent 
my city from being robbed and ruined. (47)
Outcomes other than the particular ones anticipated are possible 
from learning experiences. Some may say that such learnings are 
fragmentary and incomplete, however, Lawton states,
The danger is that by avoiding this kind of incomplete 
learning we may get to the point where rote learning is 
valued much more than understanding in depth, especially 
if that understanding is incomplete . (48;
Richard Bring adopts a similar position:
What range of objectives is to be included in 'understanding 
mathematics'? What particular behaviours are to count as
having understood 1 simultaneous equations'? Is it simply 
a matter of coming out with the right answers to certain 
sums? Is this what understanding simultaneous equations 
means? This does not seem likely because that behaviour 
might show simply good guess-work or memorization-. (49)
ttP. H. Hirst in an article, The Nature and Structure of 
Curriculum Objectives** in which he adopts the fundamental 
value of objectives in curriculum , but he objects to their 
characterization in behavioural form. His fundamental objection 
being:
... this view either legislates a meaning for such terms 
as say 'understanding' and 'appreciation' which is simply 
false, or it confuses understanding and appreciation with 
observable evidence for them .... And to achieve certain 
outward and visible signs as the objectives in one's 
teaching is all too frequently consistent with failing to 
achieve the state of mind desired . (50)
The task of specifying objectives in certain subjects is partic-
wularly difficult. Stenhouse in an article entited, Some
Limitations of the Use of Objectives in Curriculum Research 
>>
and Planning writes,
In the arts, at least, a specification of content - such 
as Hamlet - should restrict itself to identifying a work 
of art, to nominating the stimulus on imput, the experience 
to which students are to be exposed. The aixn'to understand 
Hamlet1, is not susceptible of analysis in terms of content 
elements. Here, 'understanding' means to respond to or 
experience the concrete reality of a work of art. (51)
The specification of specific terminal behavioural objectives 
is, therefore, questionalbe. From this point Pring goes on to 
argue that the educational process should be seen as a process 
of on - going inquiry or activity rather than a process of
11.. adopting behaviour or specific ways of seeing, judging, 
and evaluating things ... w (52)
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•one's conception of the inquiry or activity is altered in
the very pursuit of it' so that to specify outcomes in
advance is to lose sight of the nature of what one is engaged
53.in. Charity James in her book Young Lives at Stake(1968)
makes a similar point when she argues that objectives place exces­
sive demands on teachers and pupils, both of whom are inclined to
accept them as ’given' and unquestionable, so that they lose ■ 
the opportunity for active participation in the educational 
process. Education to use her own words is concerned with 
'enquiry' and 'dialogue' and not with peripheral objectives 
which are the image of a factory assembly life not a school.
This, as Richard Pring points out, is what John Dewey
meant when he said that education is a life long process, that
our ends constantly change as we approach them and in fact are ■
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never attained . If such a view is accepted terminal objectives 
would appear inappropriate. Priyi'g* s conclusion is that we should 
be working for agreement upon principles of procedure rather 
.than on terminal behaviours, not with particular preconceived 
goals but with the norms and principles according to which we 
intend that pupils should act within the continuous and life 
long process of education.
This view of the curriculum has been operationalized in 
Great Britain by Lawrence Stenhouse in the Humanities Curriculum 
Project. The various diciplines of knowledge are placed at 
the disposal of the student, and their standards and principles 
guide their work, rather than they being channelled into
E d u c a t i o n a l  a c t i v i t i e s  h e  s a y s ,  a r e  ' o n g o i n g  e v e n t s ’ a n d
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objectives conceived by the teacher. Stenhouse writes:
I am arguing then that one of the main functional 
advantages of the disciplines of knowledge and of 
the arts is to allow us to specify content, rather 
than objectives, in curriculum, the content being 
so structured and infused with criteria, that given 
good teaching, student learnings can be treated as 
outcomes, rather than made the subject of prespecifi- 
cationse Disciplines allow us to specify content 
rather than output in the educational process. (55)
However, this does begin to highlight that decisions have to 
be made about the activities that the pupils are going to be 
engaged in. Whether we speak of principles of procedure, 
objectives or content itself, choice must be made on the activ­
ities that are considered desirable. In short, the value 
question must be faced at some stage and the basis on which 
we can look for a solution to problems of this kind must now 
be considered.
B. Educational Aims and Values and The Behavioural Objectives 
Model
This brings us to the second major ciritcism of the behavioural 
objectives model, namely that through the adoption of a 
scientific stance, proponents of this model avoid questions 
regarding the overall criteria for the selection of objectives. 
However, there must be some justification for the selection 
of one objective rather than another.
It will be the argument of this section that a concept of 
education is vital in selecting our purposes as teachers. And
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those activities which we choose must be selected by virtue 
of certain intrinsic features of a kind likely to promote the 
development of those qualities what we would associate with 
the notion of an 'educated' person. This involves one in the 
area of ethical philosophy. John S. Brubacher writes:
Ethical considerations come up unavoidably in examining 
the social or political setting of the educative process, 
to say nothing of its religious and moral dimensions.
In examining the aims of education, the motivation of 
learning, or the measurement of its results we are inescape- 
ably dealing with ethical problems, problems of value.
Values are also an important consideration in selecting 
which studies shall be included in the curriculum . (56)
Questions of value have not concerned the behavioural objectives 
advocates, being scientists they purge themselves of such 
questions. (Sockett 1976)
The most influential psychologist in the field of educat-
57ional objectives is Benjamin S. Bloom who exercises a strict 
scientific approach in the taxonomy of cognitive and affective 
educational objectives. His approach makes it necessary for 
him to avoid all questions of value, all questions regarding 
the grounds on which we might choose one objective rather than 
another. His only criterion seems to be that the objectives 
are chosen from observing what is actually going on in schools 
or read in discussions of what should go on in schools. As 
J. H. Gribble states, in an article called>,y Pandora' s Box':
The affective domain of Educational ObjectivesBloom's 
Taxonomy is deliberately neutral. He says that Bloom has no 
concept of education, so that he cannot make any comparative 
evaluation of objectives and cannot provide any'Criteria by which
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decision can be made as to what will count as an educational 
objective. Gribble writes:
... no satisfactory account of educational objectives in 
either the cognitive or affective domain can be made unless 
it has reference throughout to what are desirable and 
appropriate changes . (58)
This particular problem becomes clearer when we begin to establish
a concept of education and its justification. Education
59ultimately is about aims. Aims, however of the educational 
process are concerned with something that is worthwhile and 
thereby are normative rather than empirical questions. According 
to Richard Pring, for example, aims are in essence, a statement 
about what a pupil should learn; the skills, attitudes, under­
standings and values which it is thought he could acquire from 
the course. Whereas objectives merely describe the intended 
outcomes of the teaching. He writes:
Aims indicate more abstract, general and value orientated 
goals, whereas 'objectives’ indicate more specific 
descriptive goals . (50)
Specifying objectives from aims is not an easy task „
since aims involve value questions in the 
first place. Agreement on value questions is not likely to be 
a simple process. Teachers are likely to have different sets 
of values in regard to education, and it is not clear just how 
far reasoned argument and discussion can resolve such differ­
ences.
The behavioural objectives proponents have overlooked such 
questions, through their emphasis upon'.scientifically structured
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educational system. Indeed, E. F. Schumacher in his book 
Small is Beautiful is very critical of how our age in which
the emphasis on a technological education has developed at the
62expense of ultimate meaning and conviction. In support of 
his view he quotes from Etienne Gilson:
Such a development was by no means inevitable but the 
progressive growth of natural sciences has made it more 
and more probable. The growing interest taken by man 
in the practical results of science was in itself both 
natural and legitimate, but it helped to forget that 
science is knowledge, and practical results but its by­
products,... ■ ■ Before their unexpected success in 
finding conclusive explanations of the material world, 
men had begun to despise all disciplines in which such 
demonstrations could not be found, or to rebuild those 
disciplines after the pattern of the physical sciences.
As a consequence, metaphysical and ethics had to be 
either ignored or, at least, replaced by new positive 
sciences; in either case, they would be eliminated. (83)
For Schumacher education must be about something of ultimate 
value, and must provide some clarification of our ultimate 
convictions, otherwise it is of no value to man. Further, it 
must involve some vision of what human beings ought to be.
Such a view of education cannot be derived from a psychology 
or a curriculum model that places ultimate emphasis on objective 
scientific methods. This line of thought is reflected in 
Kenneth Richmond's book, The School Curriculum, where he talks 
about curriculum planning:
.... the question 'what outcomes one desired?', necessarily 
precedes 'what are we going to teach?!. While planning 
must disclaim any assumption that the shape of things to 
come can be predetermined, it cannot fail to be strongly 
influenced by the techniques of prediction, regulation and 
control. Common to all the strategies of the times - 
operations research, critical path analysis, systems . N 
engineering - is a preoccupation with knowable ends. ■ 84 )
Schumacher would, however, be insistent that the concern with 
the application of high technological achievments to education
would be connected with the decline of man rather than his
growth and development.
A technological, scientifically neutral approach will not 
capture the ultimate aims of education primarily because 
such statements are descriptive not evaluative (Pring 1971).
Such aims can only be brought about by communicating a view 
of life which cannot be achieved by trivializing education, 
that is, by attaching too much importance to teaching and 
evaluating what can be specifically predicted. Such aims, 
moreover, implies that the important aspect of the teachers 
work is to transmit to his pupils a true scale of values.
R. S. Peters in Ethics and Education writes:
The teacher is not a detached operator who is bringing 
about some kind of result in another person which is 
external to him. His task is to try to get others on 
the inside of a public form of life that he shares and 
considers to be worthwhile. (¿5)
Peters sees education not as a process that is directed at 
specific goals or objectives extrusive to the activities 
themselves, but by certain intrusive features of a kind likely 
to promote the development of those qualities we would associate
with the notion of an 'educated* person such as rationality,
66autonomy, understanding, critical awareness and so. on.
Jerome Bruner has, at a conceptical level, argued the value 
of a similar view of the educational process. He summarizes
4 0
"The training of our students in the use of mind ... with 
confidence, energy, honesty, and technique!' &7 gg
“ :What is learned is competence not particular performance1! '
h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  g o a l s  o f  f o r m a l  e d u c a t i o n  b y  s t a t i n g ,
He emphasizes the development of skill or competence in the 
individual, thus the emphasis is not upon the products of 
learning as in the behavioural approach, but rather upon the 
processes of learning. One paragraph from Toward a Theory of 
Instruction captures the spirit of the fundamental aims of 
education for Bruner.
Finally, a theory of instruction seeks to take account 
of the fact that a curriculum reflects not only the nature 
of knowledge itself but also the nature of the knower and 
of the knowledge getting process. It is the enterprize 
par excellence where the line between subject matter and 
method grows necessarily indistinct. A body of knowledge, 
enshrined in a university faculty and embodied in a series 
of authoritative volumes, is the result of much prior 
intellectual activity. To instruct someone in these 
disciplines is not a matter of getting him to commit results 
to mind. Rather, it is to teach him to participate in 
the process that makes the establishment of knowledge. We 
teach a subject not to produce little living libraries on 
that subject, but rather to get a student to think 
mathematically for himself, to consider matters as a 
historian does, to take part in the process of knowledge- 
getting. Knowledge is a process not a product. (.69)
What schools must do is bring the pupils into contact with the 
ways of thinking inherent in the various disciplines of knowledge. 
There is nothing more central to a discipline than its way of 
thinking and the basic objective for the pupil is to make such 
a way of thinking his own whether physics, history, ways of 
looking at paintings or whatever. By making these disciplines 
his own he is enabled to use it as an instrument of his thought, 
according to Bruner.
Thus the way in which we develop and increase our human 
powers
... comes through converting external bodies of knowledge 
embodied in the culture into generative rules for thinking 
about the world and about ourselves.•
This is the basis on which fundamental competence or skill is
developed in the individualand the basis on which this conception
or skill can be converted in the management of one's own enter­
prises.
Thus writers like Schumacher, Pring, Peters and Bruner seem
to agree that ultimately education must be concerned with the
development of fundamental qualities of mind and understanding.
The 'qualities of mind' reveal the ultimate concerns of education
and it is these principles of procedures that educational
considerations must give rise to. It is precisely for this
71reason that the School's Council's Humanities Project in 
Great Britain specifically avoided clearly defined objectives.
It has accepted as a fundamental principle of its practical 
proposals that, since its central concern is to help pupils to 
handle controversial issues, the notion of education requires 
that this should not be tackled from a point of view of clear 
objectives as outcomes of involvement with such issues must 
necessarily be problematic; instead of objectives they have 
chosen to work on the basis of principles of procedure such as 
the desire to develop autonomous and creative thought. Teachers'* 
and pupils' participation will inevitably change as they proceed 
through a variety of topics; only the overall principles of 
proceedure or aims will remain constant.
4 2
Ultimately surely the same must hold good for other areas 
of the curriculum, if education is to be conceived as an 
ongoing process whereby pupil and indeed teachers' qualities 
of mind develop through participation in the educational 
process.
If education does not involve such participation it will 
merely be a process of training or indoctrinating the indivi­
dual into narrowly preconceived goals.
All this casts doubt upon the role of the learning 
theorist, the human engineer and the behavioural objectives 
proponent in the educational enterprise. As Philip Jackson 
states,
The business of teaching involves much more than 
defining curriculuar objectives and moving towards 
them with dispatch; ... (72)
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The purpose of this section will be to enouire into the 
nature of knowledge as an important facxor in determining a 
theory of learning. A theory of learning inevitably embraces 
a view of the structure and organization of knowledge. Brubacker 
writes:
Just as there are different theories of truth in the 
curriculum, just so there are also different ways of 
getting to know the truth. Indeed, each conception of 
truth has its own peculiar theory of how truth is 
acquired and how learning therefore, is conditioned, (l)
It was argued in chapter 1 that the conception of knowledge, 
as derived from the Realist school of philosophy, underpinned 
the fundamental assumptions of the behaviourist view of learning 
and likewise the behavioural objectives model.
1. Realist Epistemology and Education.
This epistemology assumes an objective status for knowledge, 
independent from the person. This objective status or essential 
truth of knowledge can be verified as knowledge squares with 
reality. That is, trus knowledge is knowledge that corresponds 
to the world as it is. As relations are external and therefore 
the world exists independently of the knower, then the teacher 
may take the view, that there are physical facts and social 
customs, which constitute the realities of life, to be included 
in the curriculum and learned. Learning in such a case will 
largely be the discovery of antecedent truths. The accuracy of
CHAPTER 3
T h e  S t r u c t u r e  A n d  O r g a n i z a t i o n  O f  K n o w l e d g e
44
what is learned will turn on how closely it corresponds to 
external reality.
This objective view of knowledge is represented in traditional
epistemology and analytic philosophy. Learning is not a creation
but a relization of absolute truth. This taken for granted
world of everyday reality is rarely questioned. The role of
the intellect is merely to apprehend this world. The curriculum
acquaints the child with what is 'out there'. A realization
of this world provides the probability on which rational action
is based. This view in contemporary form is represented by
such writers as Hirst^, Philip Phenix^, and King and Bownell^,
5and historically by Plato in those ideas, universals and
£
principles which embody knowledge at its highest level. Lawton 
refers to these writers as representing the classical view of 
the curriculum, which sees the curriculum in terms of the discip­
lines of knowledge, through which the young members of society
are inducted into the established forms of thought and under-1,
standing.
Ultimately this implies a passive view of man, Brubacher 
states:
"The curriculum representing the social culture, became a 
sort of procrustean bed for the learner. ... it is 
incumbent upon the school to provide a curriculum which
will broaden him out and introduce him to the law and
order of the universe". (7)
The curriculum is prescribed without reference to the child. The 
child absorbs the 'knowledge1; his mind is preoccupied with 
mirrowing the universe of knov/ledge.
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However, this objective view of knowledge has not been 
■universally acceptable and an opposite metaphysic has been 
proposed. To the idealist and realist the accuracy of what 
is learned will turn on how it corresponds to external reality. 
If, on the other hand, this external reality is denied and the 
nature of the world is seen to depend somewhat on the relations 
or reactions of the learner to it' truth will not be just a 
matter of accurate correspondence between reality and what is 
learned, but will dépend, in part on how the -learner1s reactions 
or activities turn out. This latter theory would imply a 
totally different view of curriculum, the child and the concept 
of learning. The curriculum would not be as easily determined 
and the child would not be seen as someone passive who merely
i
absorbs knowlëdge. Brubacher writes:
"This view rejects the idea that subject is something that 
can be put in cold storage against some contingent day 
of use. It refuses to treat a curriculum like a deposit 
which is to be handed down from generation to generation 
as an object which can be wrapped up in a package form 
and handed to students. Such conceptions are too static» 
Rather the curriculum is thought of as dynamic." (8)
A static conception of knowledge is rejected and the learner 
is seen in a more agressive active role who ;seeks out infor­
mation. Knowledge is not seen as something ’out there1 which 
the learner acquires rather it is something he makes his own. 
Geoffrey M . Esland writes;
"... objective reality as an agglomeration of phenomena 
external to the body has to be subjectively realized 
before it has any meaning." (9)
Malcolm Skilbeck ^ refers to this as the Romantic view of 
knowledge or the curriculum, and contrasts it with the classical
<-6








Standards are externally imposed by 'society', whereas 
expression is unique and individual; structure is concerned 
with established concepts and processes of disciplines, style 
is personal; unity is socially defined, diversity is a move 
away from norms and social consensus; excellence assumes one 
agreed set of standards, excellences assume a variety of 
views; rationality means working according to rules, experience 
implies individual freedom from rules; curriculum based on 
culture is monolithic, one based on sub-cultures is pluralistic.
The polarization between these two views of knowledge is 
further illustrated by Brubacher's concept of the universal 
and the individual in education. The classical as an education 
representing the universal is seen as.an education^
... which stresses what is common or essential to all 
human nature. ... Instead of teaching children how to 
adopt themselves to the particular environment in which 
they live, a too narrow objective, education will teach 
them to adjust to any clime or epoch. Eor the same 
reason, what is universally applicable will justify 
a prescribed rather than an elected curriculum. (11)
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The universal has a primordial existence, therefore, it cannot 
be the product of the human mind rather it is discovered by it. 
The opposing view, however, sees
e. e individuality rather than universality, conflict rather 
than harmony, as more truly generic traits of reality...
A educational philosophy constructed from this point of view 
will leave its own distinctive impress on educational purposes. 
In place of making the school a procrustean bed for the 
child, will bend every energy toward individualizing 
instruction both as to curriculum and as to method. The 
indigenous experience of the child rather than the universality 
of reason will become the measure of educational practice. (12
However, it was the realist, objective epistemology that provided 
the underpinning rationale for the behaviourist school of 
psychology and also the behavioural' objectives model of curri­
culum planning. Erubacher, when discussing educational measure­
ment and evaluation refers to the realist epistemology as the • 
storage or warehouse theory of learning ...
... which, on the'whole, has been accepted as the basis 
of scientific measurement by its proponents. Their chief 
contribution has been to render the application of theory 
more exact, for in spite of the rather external character 
of the curriculum implied by the storage concept, judge­
ment of its mastery has been very subjective and hence 
unreliable. Consequently, the scientific measurement 
movement has recommended itself to teachers chiefly because 
of the objectivity and reliability it has introduced into 
assaying the educative process. • (13)
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The empirical concern for what can be objectively studied 
has been the dominant paradigm in educational research and in 
the social sciences generally. It has already been seen how 
important it is in behaviourism and the behavioural objectives 
model. Geoffrey M. Esland, in an article based on material 
presented for the degree of M.A. at the University of London 
and published in Knowledge and Control (Ed.) Michael D. Young 
(1971), refers to this as the1 scientific epistemology1 ^  
and writes that it began with Bacon's 'Idols' (in Novum Organum 
1620) and continued to reverberate during the 19th century,
through ulititarianism and positivism and into the 
twentieth century through logic, analytic philosophy 
and behaviourism. In one form or another, it was the 
dominant social and political concept of the Western 
world. It inevitably created the validitional 
parameters of the social sciences - particularly 
psychology - and has led to the persistence of the 
objectivistic scientism which lies at the'heart, of 
much modern empiricism-. (15)
This is a very serious epistemology.
It turns everything including man himself into an 
object of inquiry. As an epistemology it can study 
the world in no other way. The element of human 
subjectivity is by definition outside science . (16)
However, the value of this scientific epistemology in relation 
to human research is presently being questioned by a number 
of writers. Esland for instance, regards it as basically 
dehumanizing in that it ignores the intentionality and express­
ivity of human action. He writes:
"Such a view implicitly presents man as a passive 
receiver, as a pliable, socialized embodiment of
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external facticities. He is represented not as a 
world - producer, but as world - produced. We 
have, therefore, a reified philosophy in which 
objectivity is autonomized and which does not regard 
as problematic for the constituency of the object 
its constituation in the subjective experience of 
individuals . (17)
Esland is among those within sociology who argue that a new 
perspective from the scientific epistemology is required to 
explain adequately the human organism. The traditional 
explanation within sociology - structuralism / functionalism
- with which Esland is critical can be clearly seen in such
1 ftwork as The Sociology of Education by Olive Banks.
In her book, Banks attempts to relate social class, educat­
ional achievement with McClelland's achievement motivation 
concept. She notes that the consistent tendency of working 
class children to perform less well at school and to leave 
school earlier than middle class children, even,when ability ■ 
is matched, needs explanation. Clearly this is true, but as 
we shall see the kind of explanation offered by sociologists 
working within this framework of structuralism functionalism 
has been causal in nature, because of the kind of assumptions 
they have taken»
Banks draws upon a wide range of sociological research that 
has attempted to relate social class to educational achievement. 
However, she fails to find a clearly defined relationship, which 
she attributes either to methodological weaknesses in the studies 
or insufficient methodological evidence. But surely to find 
a causal relationship in human behaviour is to adopt an 
inappropriate model. This approach omits reference to the
child's personal interpretations of the situation in which he 
finds himself, the meanings he attaches to it and his own 
intentions. Human beings must be considered purposive organisms. 
To accept that because a child is born of a certain family that 
his aspirations, attitudes and achievements are thereby deter­
mined is to accept a highly pessimistic, deterministic view of 
man. The model is very similar to the behaviouristic model 
in that it strips the child of his own understandings, inter­
pretations and intentions. If we view children as being cap­
able of purpose and intention and in view of the problems high­
lighted in the previous chapter regarding behaviourist 
psychology it seems that a new theoretical perspective for the 
study of human affairs is required. The main purpose of this 
paper is to raise questions about the way children learn, it 
seems essential that consideration must be given to the way 
children interpret their experience in the school, since 
although they may share common experiences at school, they do 
not necessarily see the same meanings because of the different 
latent cultures they bring with them from the outside. Unless 
the teacher can understand something of the way children 
experience and interpret the world, he will hardly be in a 
position to aid them in their learning.
There are very definite signs within sociology that such 
new perspective is emerging.
2. Alternative Conception Of Human Research.
The new paradigm that is emerging within sociology challenges 
what Esland calls the ' epistemological sufficiency of object-
ivism» and in so doing it attempts to establish a different
perpective which regards the individual as an 'active agent
making sense of and coming to terms with the world in which 
20he livesr </
This new sociological paradigm - generally referred to as 
phenomenology - is opposed to any kind of mechanistic view of 
human behaviour, rejecting all forms of determinism whether 
biological, psychological, social or cultural.
Within the sociology of education, the new direction has 
been pioneered by Hargreaves (1972), Young (1971 ), Esland (1971), 
Keddie (1971), and Lacey (1970). Much of their inspiration has 
been derived from the petçenomenological sociologist Alfred Sc huts. 
However, it would seem that they have much in common and that they 
owe a debt to the synthesis made by Berger and Luckman (1967).
In rejecting a mechanical view of man, the ‘phenomenologist 
sees man as creatively and actively developing his own percep­
tions» The essential quality of man that frees him from the 
determination of the natural world is his ability to engage in 
symbolic communication, the significance of which is to be seen 
whereby men through symbolic communication learn to take the 
role of the other. In these terms social structure is seen as 
human construction, resulting from the consciousness of people, 
which accjiire in their socialization a 'sense of social structure',' 
and through their interpretative action in the social world 
reproduce it.
To the phoenomenologist, however, consciousness is not some 




the physical world. Rachel Sharp and Anthony Green state:
Consciousness refers to the particular subjective way 
the individual has internalized the reality of the 
external world, to use the Ethnomethodologist's terms, 
'negotiated reality is accomplished . (217
Clearly such an approach to reality is very different from 
the one that sees societies as embodying mechanistic terms or 
causal relationships. Further Sharp and Green summarize the 
essence of phenomenology as follows:
The stress within this perspective lays on the creative 
knowling subject and his ability through symbolic 
communication with others to create both himself and his 
world brings the individual right into the forefront of 
history and society. The rejection of mechanistic 
determinism makes the search for causal regularities 
either at the psychological level or at the social level 
inappropriate . (22)
Moreover this perspective avoids any attempt to reify society 
rather society must be dereified, the sociologist must proceed
through 'the subtle texture of meaning which constitutes social
23reality'•.
The motivation for this perspective springs, as John 
Eggleston writes, from the concern
... for the fundamental distinction between the scientists 
and the social scientists. Human beings are neither 
consistently j_ogical nor reliable predictable in their 
behaviour . (24)
Similarly, E. F. Schumacher in his book Small is Beautiful, 
gives a very interesting account of how the assumption of most 
social science research that human behaviour can only be 
explained as causal relationships is inappropriate at the human 
level. He postulates and argues that . research problems
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in the physical world are convergent, in that they ultimately 
answer to the laws of cause and effect. When convergent 
problems have been solved, the solution can be written down 
and passed on to others, who can apply it without needing to 
reproduce the mental effort necessary to find it. But, on 
the other hand, such is not the case with human problems. 
Schumacher writes:
If this were the case with human relations - in family 
life, economics, polities, and so forth, - well I am 
at a loss to finish the sentence. There would be no 
more human relations only mechanical reactions . (25)
Further he states:
The true problems of living - in politics, education 
marriage, etc. - are always problems of overcoming and 
reconciling opposites. They are divergent problems and 
have no solution in the ordinary sense of the word.
They demand of man not merely the employment of his 
reasoning powers but the committment of his whole person­
ality. ("26)
Because human problems are by their nature so elusive, they 
cannot be understood in a mechanical way. If tackled thus we 
"lose the very quality of human life". (27)
It is because of this that the phenomenologist proposes an 
alternative method of sociological inquiry. The essence of 
this phenomenological approach can be seen in the sociology 
of knowledge which directly challenges the theoretical suffic­
iency of objectivism and positivism.
However, before the sociology of knowledge is examined, a 
world of caution regarding this new sociological method is 
required. Rachael Sharp and Anthony Green in their book
Education and Social Control (1975) offer very important
criticisms of this approach. They consider phenomenology and
structuralism / functionalism as two extreme positions neither
of which can satisfactorily cope with sociological inquiry.
They reject the mechanistic account because it fails to give
28any antonomy to the individual. However, their cirticism
of phenomenology is more complex.
They argue that the solution to the proper understanding
of sociological inquiry is not only more complex than either
of these solutions may suggest, but it is also suggested by
such writers as Lukács, 1971; Korch, 1970; Goldmann, 1969;
29Altmusser, 1970; Gowdelier, 1972;. Their solution is
particularly original and important. They argue that one of 
the problems that they are faced with is that the debate regard­
ing the relationship between 'consciousness1 and 'reality' has 
been conducted at a highly abstract and theoretical levdl.
And they are suggesting that some insights might be gained by 
bringing the debate down from the formal level to substantive 
empirical reality. This is not, however, they argue,
... to advocate an empiricist approach to the resolution 
of fundamental metatheoretical issues. Such an attitude 
would be absurd. Rather it is suggested that through 
about particular empirical problems might help to clarify 
one's conceptualization of the philosophical problematics.
It is on this premise that our work has proceeded . (.30)
Prom their own work they argue, that in relation to the 
negotiation of reality, the problems of power will be seen to 
be crucial. In relation to education, for instance, they argue 
that we need to see the actors in this situation not as free 
and equal participants engaged in the social exchange we call
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education, together building up in an open context some 
mutually acceptable definition of reality but, in terms 
frequently, of actors with varying degrees of power to define 
reality to others.
Sharp and Green write:
"What seems to be crucial is whether in the last analysis 
one can control others and bring sanctions to bear against 
others, irrespective of their definition of reality. And 
the ability to do this derives not from language, the 
system of symbolic meanings itself (Gerger and Luckmann,
1967), but from the distribution of power and authority in 
the macro-structure. The precise relationship between 
different forms of power is empirically problematic in any 
given situation". ('31)
This need not, however, detain us any longer as the resolution
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of as yet unresolvable theoretical dilemas is not the purpose 
of this paper. But, in the context of the present discussion 
it is important merely to point out that while the phenomen- 
'ologist approach is not any kind of social science panacea, 
it is important in that it focuses on the concept of the indiv­
idual rather than on some concept of 'society'. And further 
the emphasis upon the individual and how he preceives reality 
must be important in the context of a discussion on learning, 
as learning is ultimately in itself an individual act.
3'. The Sociology of Knowledge.
It has been suggested in this chapter that the phenomen­
ological method has been proposed by those who regard traditional 
'scientific1approaches to human research as essentially inap­
propriate. In particular, in relation to the sociology of
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education phenomenologists disagree with ¿the assumptions of such 
structuralist / functionalist writers as Olive Banks and her 
interpretation of the relationship between social class and 
education.
In criticism of this kind of work Michael P. Young writes:
It would not be doing these studies an injustice to say 
say that they developed primarily from a sociological 
interest in stratification in the narrow sense rather 
than education. They were concerned to show how the 
distribution of life chances through education can be 
seen as an aspect of the class structure. Inevitalby 
this led to an over - mechanistic conception of 'class' 
which isolated the 'class' characteristics of individuals 
from the 'class' content of their education . (33)
The structuralist /functionalist perspective poses as unproble­
matic the character of the education that the working class 
child failed at. To the phenomenologist questions, such as 
'what it is to be educated1 and how knowledge is organized 
within schools, must not be taken as given but rather posed 
as problematic. Young writes:
... there is no alternative but for the sociologist to 
'make' his own problems as phenomena to be explained; 
that is, not just to critisize earlier sociological 
research, but to ask what implicit assumptions led some 
questions (about selection) to be asked and others (about 
academic education) to be treated as given. It is 
suggested that in this way, certain fundamental features 
of educators' world are taken for granted, such as what 
counts as educational knowledge, and how it is made 
available, become objects of enquiry. (34)
In challenging the assumptions that have been taken for granted 
by traditional sociological research, Young and others within 
this school are primarily interested in posing as problematic 
the nature of knowledge. Knowledge cannot be taken as given
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as in the realist view rather it must be the subject of inquiry.
What counts as knowledge in society is thereby questioned
by those interested in the sociology of knowledge. The
sociology of knowledge holds that our view of knowledge is to
some extent socially determined; that is, the philosophical
analysis of knowledge itself is not uncontaminated by the kind
35of society in which it originated. Thus as Lawton points 
out the two basic notions to the sociology of knowledge are 
first, reality is not universally perceived in the same way, 
second that within a given culture different members have 
differential access to knowledge which is related to their 
position in the social structure.
Peter Berger and T. Luckmann in their book The Social
Construction of Reality (1967), provide a clear account of what
is meant by the sociology of knowledge. Though they were not
concerned in their book to apply the sociology of knowledge 
to education, it has proved, nevertheless, very influential in 
this regard.
One of their main contributions was to consider that
"the sociology of knowledge must concern itself with everything
3 6that passes for knowledge in society". On the other hand 
academic knowledge only provides a very limited view of reality. 
There is a range of knowledge in society from the common-sense 
everyday knowledge to theoretical knowledge. As Peter Berger 
has suggested and summarized by Geoffrey Esland:
This will not be a one - dimensional or uniform - quality 
knowledge, but will be a composite of different kinds of
of knowledge corresponding to how they are distributed 
in the different levels of consciousness - broadly 
distinguished as pre-reflective (or enactive), pre- 
theoretical, and theoretical". (37)
The sociology of knowledge, then is concerned with the relation 
between human thought and the social context within which it 
arises. Knowledge, according to Berger and Luckmann is related 
to social structure in terms of different views of reality.
How this reality is perceived is of central importance to 
Berger and Luckmann.
The institutionalized world has an objective reality, its 
history predates the birth of the individual. This history 
itself, has a character of objectivity.
The institutions, as historical and objective facilities 
confront the individual as undeniable facts. The insti-- 
tutions are there, external to him, persistent in their 
reality, whether he likes it or not. He cannot wish them 
away (38)
Since institutions exist as external reality, the individual
cannot understand them’by introspection. He must go out and
learn about them, just as he must learn about nature. However,
the objectivity of the external world, according to Berger and
Luckmann, no matter how massive it may appear to the individual,
is a humanly constructed reality.
This process by which the externalized products 
of human activity attain the character of obj- 
tivity is objectivation. The institutionalized 
world is objectivated human activity '. (3.9)
The institutionalized world is objectivated human activity, 
that is despite the objectivity that marks the social world 
in human experience, it does not thereby acquire an ontological 
existence apart from the human activity that produced it. 
Reality is thereby socially constructed.
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... it is important to emphasize that the relationship 
between man, the producer and his social world, is and 
remains a dialectic one. That is, man (not of course 
in isolation, but in his collectiveness) and his social 
world interact with each other. (40)
Society, therefore, according to Berger and Luckmann exists as 
both subjective and objective reality. The objective will be 
realized differently by each individual simply by virtue of 
being a specific individual with a specific biography. Thus 
this reality will "have relevance both to the man in the street 
and to the philosopher". ^
Thus Berger and Luckmann believe that "the sociology of
knowledge must concern itself with everything that passes for
42knowledge in society". It follows from this that theore­
tical formalations of reality, whether they be scientific or 
philosophical do not exhaust what is 'real' for the members 
of a society.
Since this is so, the sociology of knowledge must first 
of all concern itself with what people 'know' as 'reality' 
in their everyday non - pre-theoretical lives (43)
This view of knowledge has important implications for the 
educational enterprize. It rejects the realist view of know­
ledge, in terms of theoretical systems and disciplines, as 
being an incomplete view of reality. A school thereby that 
would emphasize academic knowledge solely would have a limited 
view of reality. And thereby would be concentrating on a 
reality that is very different from the range of reality 
from academic knowledge to everyday understanding. It would 
be an emphasis on what Brunbacher called 'universals' as 
opposed to 'individuals'. ^4 To the sociology of knowledge 
adherent, knowledge only exists as it is inter-subjectively 
realized be each individual . Berger and Luckmann writing 
about this - intersubjective realization of the external 
world state:
"I know that my natural attitude to this world corresponds 
to the natural attitudes of others, but they also compre­
hend the objectifications by which this world is ordered, 
that they also organize this world around the 'here and 
now' of their being in it and have projects for working 
in it. I also know, of course, that the others have a 
perspective on this common world that is not identical 
with mine. My 'here' is their 'there*. My 'now* does 
not fully overlap with 'theirs'". (.45)
The manner in which this world is realized is very important
to the phenomenologist. Each individual must personally and
in his own way realize this world. Because of the subjective
element inherent in its realization, the phenomenologist seems
'46to be emphasizing something of what Skilbeck has said about 
expression, style, diversity, excellences, experience, sub­
cultures as the essential characteristics of knowledge acquis­
ition.
And further, this sociological perspective seems to suggest 
that there is much more to the educational process and to an 
understanding of human learning than mere objective observable 
behaviour. This point becomes clearer, when something more is 
said about how the phenomenologist views the interalization of 
reality or knowledge by the individual.
To the phenomenologist the realization of the external world 
can only be achieved meaningfully through the existentialist 
experience of the individual. Each individual actively comes
to terms with experience... This is, of course, a' clear challange
' \
to the conception of knowledge held by traditional epistemologies 
and positivism. Geoffrey Esland writes:
61
"One of the fundamental points of this study is that 
objective reality as an agglomeration of phenomena 
external to the body has to be subjectively realized 
before it has any meaning." (.47)
As knowledge is no longer seen as objective and external, but 
rather as problematic and subject to individual interpretation, 
Esland writes,
''the focus, therefore, is now diverted from how man 
absorbs knowledge so that he can replicate it to 
how the individual creativelv synthesizes and 
generates knowledge,... ('4$)
This epistemology as Young writes is unlike the view of learn­
ing theory - a view that has dominated the experimental psychol­
ogy of learning - in "that it incorporates a dialectic view of
49man as a world producer as well as a social produce" . This 
thereby denies any attempt to reify society. Reification of 
social reality would destroy the infinitive -variety and ’humaness’ 
of learning,,
"... reification can be described as an extreme step 
in the process of objectivation, whereby the object- 
ivated world loses its comprehensibility as a human 
enterprise and becomes fixated as a non-human non- 
humanizable inert facticity, (50) .
Refication, however is the dominant paradigm that runs through 
positivistic philosophy, much of empirical sociology and 
behaviourist psychology. Within this perspective the individual 
is stripped of his purposes and intentions and fundamentally 
his existentialist experience in coming to terms with reality 
is denied.
Such a view of the acquisition of knowledge is essentially
the same as the existentialist philosophical outlook,, The 
existentialist like the phenomenologist challenges the value 
of a positivist outlook in the social sciences. Van Cleeve 
Morris, an existentialist writer, states,
"The reluctance of empiricist and positivist philosophies 
to take existence seriously stems, of course, from the 
fact that existential phenomena - awareness, feelings, 
anguish in many forms - do not yield to a scientific 
logic". (.51)
The existentialist advocates a view of man that transcends any 
objective inquiry. Essential to the human is its uniquiness 
as distinct from the subject of the natural sciences. Such a 
concept of man implies liberty, responsibility and commitment. 
Moreover, within existentialist philosophy people are considered 
to be basically forwardly active organisms. Hence education 
should promote each student's hightened awareness and the 
artistic expression of his self-actualization. Accordingly Van 
Cleeve Morris writes:
"... the task of education can be stipulated somewhat 
as follows: to provide the occassion and circumstances 
for the awakening and intensification of awareness". (52)
The extentialist stresses three basic human awarenesses:
"The teachers imperative is to arrange the learning 
situation in such a way to bring home the truth of 
these three positions to every person". (-53)
These three awarenesses are: I am a choosing agent; I am a
free agent; and I am a responsible agent. In his teaching, 
the teacher awakens awareness, freedom and responsibility in 
each of his students. Ralph Harper writes:
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"No school has a right to be proud of its educational 
aims if it does not take into account this most 
important area of human experience and inquiry". (54)
To Van Gleeve Morris this type of education must be discovery 
orientated. ’To become more specific and concrete, education 
must be an act of discovery'. (55)'. This discovery must be 
the 'discovery of responsibility', in that the learner discovers 
personal meaning or significance in his learning. Morris writes:-
‘Let education be the process by ’which we awaken in 
each learner the truth that he is responsible for 
his every desire to flee responsibility-. (56)
The child must be thus involved in his education. To the 
existentialist involvement means the experience of getting 
personally implicated in the situations of life. This is why 
education must be discovery. Further such a view is, opposed 
to what Morris calls the 'spectator theory' of the realists.
The existentialist view knowledge "not from the' standpoint of 
the spectator but from the standpoint of the actor, on stage 
and actively implicated in the "role of man". (.57) Thereby 
the curriculum is not something to be mastered rather it is 
something to be experienced. Therefore Morris equates educat­
ional method with the Socratic paradigm in Plato's Republic 
and The Thatus. In these dialogues Socrates was 'seeking after' 
truth that he did not understand. This according to Morris, 
is existentialist teaching. He states:
We must revive the Socratic paradigm ... in the mode 
of The Republic. And I do not mean that the exis­
tentialist teacher is always searching for new truth 
in the manner of the "serious" research scholar.
Rather, he is searching for personal truth. Personal 
truth is always new to the individual searching for it
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himself; and, for that matter, it is always new to the 
teacher also.
Thus if we accept the Socratic paradigm, the teacher 
will concentrate on asking the questions to which he does 
not know the answer. In the most literal and profound 
of ways, he will learn along with his students. (58)
Therefore the teacher - pupil relationship becomes more 
of a collaborative learning experience based on mutual respect 
rather than domination. The need for this kind of attitude on 
the part of the teacher has been sensitively described by Paulo 
Freire in Pedagogy of the Oppressed. He writes:
Authentic education is not carried on by A for B or by 
A about B, but rather by A with B, mediated by the world 
- a world which impresses and challanges both parties, 
giving rise to views or opinions about it. (59)
Authentic education to Preire is very similar to the existent­
ialist view. He is a very strong a critic of education based 
on any kind of realist philosophical world view, which he 
refers to as the 'banking concept' of education in that it 
merely 'deposits' information in the individual without any 
consideration of his own experience in coming to understand the 
knowledge. Rather than this static type of education, Preire 
proposes a problem-solving education where,
....men develop their power to perceive critically the 
way they exist in the world with which and in which they 
find themselves; they come to see the world not as 
static reality, but as a reality in process, in trans­
formation. Although the dialectical relations of men 
with the world exist independently of how these relations 
are percieved (or whether or not they are perceived at 
all), it is also true that the form of action men adopt 
is to a large extent a function of how they percieve them­
selves and the world without dichotomizing this reflection 
from action, and thus establish an authentic form of 
thought and action. (61)
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What writers similar to the phenomenologist, the existentialists 
and Freire are aiming to achieve is that the educational focus 
be diverted from the ways pupils absorb a static reality to 
a concept of education that personally challenges and actively 
involves each pupil in the learning process. In such a view 
the subjective experience of the individual is of central 
importance.
If educational learning is seen in such terms, then surely 
behavioural technology whether in the form of learning theory 
or applied in the behavioural objectives model or any other such 
scientific epistemology cannot be of great relevance to the 
teacher.
The fundamental point of importance is that the existent­
ialist view of education is by its nature unconcerned with out­
comes, to channel the child into preconceived goals world destroy 
the essence of the educational experience„ And this is precisely 
the point the Eisner and also Stenhouse have made about pres­
pecifying outcomes in the area of artistic subjects - something 
which has been dealt with in the previous chapter. Eisner, 
who has written a paper on the value of behavioural objectives 
in education, has argued that the limitations of this approach 
to education can especially be seen in the area of artistic 
subjects. He writes:
In the arts and in subject matters where, for example, 
novel or creative responses are desired, the particular 
behaviours to be developed cannot easily be identified.
Here curriculum and instruction should yield behaviors 
and products which are unpredictable. The end achieved 
ought to be something of a surprize to both teacher and
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the pupil. While it could be argued that one might 
formulate educational objective which specified novelty, 
originality, or creativeness as the desired outcome, the 
particular referents for these terms cannot be specified 
in advance; one might judge after the fact whether the 
product produced or the behaviour displayed belongs to 
the "novel" class. (62).
Similarly Stenhouse has argued how irrelevant it is to attempt 
to prespecify the outcomes from such an exercise as the study 
of Hamlet
Eisner and Stenhouse can be seen in a similar way to the 
existentialist view in that they see educational outcomes as 
complex and flexible, and prespecification of educational out­
comes is merely to destroy the whole purpose* of human learning.
To them education is about the development of certain sensi­
bilities and levels of understanding which belie the idea of 
the scientific researcher. The content of education cannot be
seen merely as instrumental, rather it is something of intrinsic 
64worth. Interestingly it was from this perspective that
Stenhouse advocated the use of the form or principle model, 
referred to in the last chapter, as the basis of an alternative 
view of the curriculum from the behavioural objectives model.
Mrs. Charity James also reflects the existentialist con­
cern for the true involvement of the child in the educational 
learning experience. She directed a curriculum development 
in London in early 1970‘s and subsequent to her involvement 
in the project, she has published her views regarding curriculum 
and, in particular, in relation to the role of behavioural 
objectives in the curriculum process.
She is particularly at pains to point out that behavioural 
technology with its emphasis on observable performance tends 
to neglect the personal experience of the individual. She 
writes regarding the behavioural objectives model:
Having taught us to analyze the person into disjecta 
membra it tempts us to think of some splendid person 
of the future whom we might create rather than the 
adolescent who is trying to communicate with us here 
and now. (65)
She feels that to see education in terms of discrete steps and 
independent units is to loose sight of the essential wholeness 
of human learning.
The pupil needs to be not only literate and numerate, 
but capable of self-direction of effort,-able as
circumstances require to use his gifts for co-operation with his fellows and to make fruitful contribution to 
the insistent present and the challenging future. An 
education that divides the "seamless coat of learning" 
makes for not only an impoverished and fragmented 
understanding of the world and mankind, but also implic- 
ily denies to the individual the means of developing 
an intergrated personality. (66)
The way to bring this about is by means of Enquiry.
As a start we suggest Enquiry as the basic concept. 
We suggest this not merely as a technique but as 
the essence of the curriculum' (67)
Placing enquiry as the essence of the curriculum shifts the 
emphasis from instructing to active exploration. Seeing learn­
ing as an active process has implications for the teacher's 
conception of his role.
The role of the teacher will be to enable the children 
to choose broad lines of enquiry and decide which are 
significant and which subsidary problems. At other 
times it will be to provide the trigger or catalyst for
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enquiry, or to show some of the ways in which enquiry 
might develop.... He will learn when and how to help 
them (i.e. the pupils) to extricate themselves from 
their predicament, analyse where they went wrong and 
find out how to choose a more fruitful path. (68)
Further the concept of enquiry has important implications for 
the concept of learning. It places emphasis upon learning in 
terms of the child actively seeking information. This is 
necessarily derived from a fundamentally different epistemo- 
logical base than the realist view. John S. Brubacher writes:
This view rejects the idea that subject matter is some­
thing that can be put in cold storage against some 
contingent day of use. It refuses to treat the curricu­
lum like a deposit which is to be handed down from one 
generation to another generation or as an object which 
can be wrapped up in package form to be handed to 
students. Such conceptions are too static. Rather 
is the curriculum to be thought of as dynamic. (69)
This approach avoids any imposition by the teacher, which in 
the view of the existentialists, the phenomenologists and such 
curriculum planners as James, Eisner, and Stenhouse, would be 
indoctrination and likely to inhibit the real learning potential 
of the pupil. Knowledge is only true and important to the 
individual in so far as it passes into his subjective conscious­
ness.
These writers, therefore, place considerable importance 
upon the child and the means whereby his intellectual develop­
ment is seen as a process of his active organizing and arrang­
ing the external world. Further support for this kind of view 
has come more recently from the work of those psychologists 
such as Piaget and Bruner who have explored the process of 
conceptual development and in so doing have come forward with a 





It has been suggested in the previous chapter that a new 
paradigm is required for the study of man as an alternative 
to behaviourist psychology in particular, and the rigorous 
scientific study of man in general. Evidence within sociology 
has been cited as an indication that such a paradigm is begin- 
ing to emerge. This view is tending towards the adoption of
an existentialist view of man and society and how man under­
stands himself and others. These views are reflected in the 
sociology of Berger and Luckmann and the phenomenologists 
generally. '
The existentialist view of man is opposed to the traditional 
philosophies which regard the acquisition of knowledge as an 
act of grasping some external object. In traditional philosophy 
what is known lies outside the learner and in the act of learning 
the individual comes into possession of the known for the first 
time. While for the existentialist the relationship between 
man and the external world is not some kind of juxtaposition as 
exists between two radically different worlds^rather the relation­
ship is a Dialectic one. The external reality is only mean­
ingful to the individual in so far as he subjectively takes hold 
of it and puts it into his own life.
1. Brunerian Psychology
The psychological theory concerning knowing and learning 
as written about by Bruner is akin to the dialectic scheme of 
the existentialist. Bruner's emphasis on the construction of 
though forms through sensory and linguistic ordering amounts to 
what Esland calls an'incipient phenomenology1 ,
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Although Professor Bruner seems not to have developed 
a systematic learning theory as such, a generalized theory 
about, and outlook concerning, learning is implicit in his 
various works. His principal concern has been with the means 
whereby people actively select, retain and transform infor­
mation, and this is the essence of learning.
In his psychology Bruner rejects behaviouristic envir­
onmental determinism without getting involved in any kind of 
opposite and extreme mystical vitalism. His own work in the 
middle and late 1950's led him to conclude that
subjects do not mechanistically associate specific . 
responses with speicifc stimuli, but rather tend to 
infer principles or rules underlying the patterns 
which allow them to transfer their learning to 
different problems".2
On the overall tv/o unifying themes recur in Bruner's 
■writings. First that learning or the acquisition of know­
ledge is an active process and second that a person actively 
constructs his knowledge through his relating incoming'infor- 
mation to a previously acquired frame of reference.
Models of the world and learning. Bruner makes much of the 
structural models of the world v/ithin which a culture equips 
its members. Such models enable persons to predict, inter­
polate, and extrapolate further knowledge. He states:
Our knowledge of the world is not merely mirroring or 
reflection of order and structure 'out there' but 
consists rather of a construct or model that can so 
to speak, be spun a bit ahead of things to predict 
how the world will be or might be. (3)
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Instead of being driven in some mechanistic fashion the child
... first learns the rudiments of achieving his 
intentions and reaching his goals. En route he 
acquires and stores information relevant to his 
purposes. In time where there is a puzzling 
process by which such purposefully organized know­
ledge is converted into a more generalized form so 
that it can be used for many ends. It then, 
becomes "knowledge" in the most general sense - 
transcending functional fixedness and egocentric 
limitations. (4)
Models in essence are expectancies. Bruner states that through 
the use of models man can not only deal with the information 
before him,
but go far beyond the information given - with all 
that this implies both for swiftness of intellect 
and for fallibility. Almost by definition, the 
exercise of the intellect, involving as it must the 
use of short cuts and leaps from partial evidence, 
always counts the possiblility of error. (5)
Hence, the person learns about the world in a way that enables
him to make predictions of what comes next by matching what 
is presently experienced to an acquired model and reading much 
from the model. Thus Bruner writes,
The eighteenth-century assumption that knowledge grows 
by a gradual accretion of associations built up by 
contact with events that are contiguous in time, space 
or quality does not fit the facts of mental life. There 
are spheres where such associative laws operate within 
limits, as, say, with material that is strange and mean­
ingless ..., but for the most part organization is a 
far more active process of imposing order - as by form­
ing a hypothesis and checking it to be sure. (6)
Learning as a cognitive process. Bruner sees learning as 
involving three'almost simultaneous processes', namely (i) 
acquisition of new information, (ii) transformation of
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knowledge and (iii) checking the pertinence and adequacy of 
7knowledge. New information may be a refinement of previous 
knowledge or it may even run counter to what a person has 
already known explicitly or implicitly. For example, one way 
teach Newton's laws of motions which violate the evidence of 
the senses. In transformation of knowledge, knowledge is man­
ipulated in order to fit new tasks. We learn to "unmask" or 
analyze information, to order it; in a way that permits extra­
polation or interpolation or conversion into another form. 
Transformation emphasizes the ways we deal with information 
in order to go beyond it. The third aspect of learning, eval­
uation, involves checking whether the way we have manipulated 
information is adequate to the task.
Bruner labels this view of learning or cognitive growth
O
as 'instrumental conceptualism' . This view is based 
according to Donald L. Bigge, on two tenets concerning the 
nature of the knowing process: (i) a person's knowledge of
the world is based on his constructed models of reality, and
(ii) such models are first adopted from one's culture, then
qthey are adopted to one's individual use .
A person's perception of an event, then, is essentially 
a constructive process within which the person infers a 
hypothesis by relating his sense data to his model of the world 
and then checks his hypothesis agaisnt additional properties 
of the event. So, a perceiver is viewed not as a passive 
reactive orgnism, but rather as a persnn who actively selects 
information, forms perceptual hypotheses, and on occassion
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distorts the environmental imput in the interest of reducing 
surprize and attaining valued goals.
Bruner writes about this view of perception:
It takes the form in ordinary experience of data being 
interpretable only in the light of the hypothesis one 
brings to bear upon it. This is essentially the hypot- 
thesis theory of perception (see Bruner, 1975; F. H Allport, 
1961) whose central premise is that it is the -processing 
of data that yields significance, not its receipt. (10)
Thus much of perception involves going beyond the information 
given through reliance on a model of the world of events that 
makes possible extrapolation, interpolation and prediction.
A person's maturing intellect or cognitive growth is 
characterized by the increasing independence of his responses 
from the immediate nature of sense impression. Such growth 
is dependent upon the individual internalizing the ability to 
develop and use "tools" or "instruments" or "technologies"
These tools make it possible for him to express and amplify 
his cognitive powers.
Such development is seen by Bruner in terms of an 
evolutionary perspective. He sees man's technological progress 
as having produced three systems which act as amplifiers of 
human capacities. There are amplifiers of human motor capacities 
(for example, a knife), amplifiers of human sensory capacities 
(a wireless or rador), and amplifiers of human thought processes 
(from language to myth to scientific theories). He distinguishes 
three of these systems of skills that correspond to the three 
major tool systems to which man must link himself for the full 
expression of his capacities. These three systems of skills
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are Bruner’s modes of representation and he identifies three 
modes of representation of reality as enactive, iconic and
12 \ v,?symbolic . The presence!enactive and iconic indicate that 
the data of the here - and - now experience may or may not be 
referred to the interpretational schemes provided by the linguis­
tic ordering of symbolic knowledge. The power to transcend 
the here and present lies in the possibilities of extrapolation 
which lie in the mapiluation of symbols. Therefore, the strength 
of the mode of representation or 'referral system' is critical 
for the development of this power.
Bruner uses the study of a balance beam to illustrate 
the distinction between the three modes of representation:
A quite young child can plainly act on the basis of 
of the "principles" of a balance beam, and indicates 
that he can do so by being able to handle himself on 
a see-saw. He knows that to get his side to go down 
farther he has to move out farther from the center.
A somewhat older child can represent the balance 
beam to himself either by a model on which rings can 
be hung and balanced or by a drawing. The "image" 
of the balance beam can be varyingly defined, with 
fewer and fewer irrelevant details present, as in 
the typical diagrams in an introductory textbook in 
physics. Finally, a balance beam can be (symbolically) 
described in ordinary English, without diagrmmatic 
aids, or it can be even described mathematically by 
reference to Newton's Law of Movements in inertial 
physics. (13)
Therefore the acquisition of knowledge is not simply a progress­
ive movement from enactive (or concrete operations) to symbolic 
(formal operations); rather "it occurs through the routin- 
ization of referral sequences and their further elaboration 
into epistemologies". ^
Thus Bruner modifies Piaget's stages of development some­
what by suggesting that an epistemology operates at different
levels of consciousness and therefore produces different 
'textures' of knowledge. Bruner writes:
It is not that there are "stages" in any sense; rather 
there are emphases in development. You must get the 
perceptual field organized around your own person as 
center before you can impose other, less egocentric 
axes upon it, for example. In the end, the mature 
organism seems to have gone through a process of 
elaborating three systems of skill the correspond to 
the three major tool systems to which he must link 
himself for full expression of his capacities - tools 
for the hand, for the distance receptors, and for the 
process of reflection (15).
Central to this epistemology is a view of human learning 
as being derived from a dialectic relationship between conscious­
ness and socially approved knowledge. Bruner states that 
man's very evolution as a species speaks to this point.
It was consequent upon the development of bipedalism 
and the use of spontaneous pebble tools that man's 
brain and particularily his contex developed. It was 
not a large-brained hominid that developed the tech­
nical - social life of the human; rather it was the 
tool - using, cooperative pattern that gradually 
changed man's morphology by favoring the survival 
of those who could link themselves with tool systems 
and disfavoring those who tried to go it on big 
jaws, heavy dentition, or superior weight. 7/hat 
evolved as a human nervous system was something then, 
that required outside devices for expressing its 
potential. It was a swift progress. The first 
primitive primates appeared five million years ago 
and man reached his present morphology and brain size 
about half a million years ago - with the major 
development of higher hominid to tool r user occupying 
probably less than half a million of years between. 
From then on the major changes in the speipes were,... 
by prosthetic devices, by man's learning" how to link 
himself to amplifiers of his muscles, of his senses, 
and of his powers of ratiocination. (16)
This view of human learning dereifes both the child and 
knowledge. It also calls for a revision of objectivistic 
assumptions about human intelligence. It alters our thinking
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about intelligence from that implied in the psychometric model. 
As John Holt expressed it:
Unintelligence is not what most psychologists seem to 
suppose - the same thing as intelligence only less of 
it. It is an extremely different style of behaviour 
arising out of an entirely different set of attitudes, ( n )
Bruner himself outlines the characteristics of this epistemology 
in Towards a Theory of Instruction:
I suspect that much of growth starts out by our turning 
around on our traces and recording in new forms, with 
the aid of adult tutors, what we have been doing or 
seeing, then going on to new modes of organization with 
the new products that have been formed by these ....
The new models are formed in increasingly powerful 
representational systems. It is this that leads me to 
think that the heart of educational process consists 
in providing aids and dialogues for translating 
experience into more powerful systems of notation and 
ordering. And it is for this reason that I think a 
theory of development must be linked both to a theory 
of knowledge and a theory of instruction, or be doomed 
to triviality. (18)
2. New Classroom Pedagogy.
Basil B. Bernstein (1971) has suggested that when a methodology
based upon Bruner's epistemology is applied to teaching
"the pedagogy is likely to proceed from the deep structure to
19the surface structure". According to Bernstein there are
two broad types of curriculum namely a collection type and 
an integrated type. He understands the collection type as 
one where,
... contents stand in a closed relation to each other, 
that is, if the contents are closely bounded and 
insulated from each other, I shall call such a curricu­
lum a collection type. Here, the learner has to collect 
a group of favoured contents in order to satisfy some 
criteria of evaluation. (20).
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While integration, as it is used by Bernstein, "refers mini­
mally to the subordination of previously insulated subjects
or courses to some relational idea, which blurs the boundaries
21between subjects".
The collection code involves an hierarchical arrange­
ment of knowledge, such that the ultimate mysteries of the 
subject is revealed very late in educational life. By the 
ultimate mystery of a subject Bernstein suggests is its potential 
for creating new realities. It is also the case, and this is 
important, that the ultimate mysteries of a subject is not 
coherence, but incoherence; not order but, disorder; not the 
known but the unknown. Bernstein writes:
As this mystery, under collection codes is revealed 
very late in educational life - and then only to 
a select few who have shown the signs of successful 
socialization - then only the few experience in their 
bones the notion that knowledge is permeable, that 
its orderings are provisional, that the dialectic of 
knowledge is closure and openness. For the many, 
socialization into knowledge is socialization into 
order, the existing order, into the experience that 
the world's educational knowledge is impermeable.- (22)
On the other hand the pedagogy of the integrated code is 
likely to proceed from the deep structure to the surface 
structure. Bernstein suggests that the consequences of this 
will lead to an emphasis upon, and exploration of,
general principles and the concepts through which these 
principles are obtained. In turn, this is likely to 
affect the orientation of pedagogy, which will be less 
concerned to emphasize how knowledge is created. In 
other words, the pedagogy of integrated codes is likely 
to emphasize various ways of knowing in the pedagogical 
relationships. With the collection code, the pedagogy 
tends to proceed from the surface structure to the 
deep structure; as we have seen, only the elite have 
access to the deep structure and therefore access to the
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realizing of new realities or the experiental 
knowledge that new realities are possible. (23)
What counts as knowledge for Bruner and Bernstein is 
something that occurs following an involvement by the knower 
in the process of knowing. Knowledge is thereby personalized. ^ 
Consequently knowledge in the curriculum should not be regarded 
as an objective entity which can be clearly specified and 
set out in advance.
Concepually a similiar line of argument, to Bruner and 
Bernstein regarding the nature of knowledge and personalized 
learning, is being argued by a number of educational philosophers 
at the Institute of Education, London University - B. S. Peters 
1969, P. P. Dearden, 1968, and D. W. Hamlyn, 1973» for example.
Professor Peters, in his book Ethics and Education, 
states that educational knowledge must involve understanding, 
otherwise it would be mere 'inert' knowledge. If knowledge 
is not to be inert Peters states:
It must involve, some kind of committment that comes 
from being on the inside of a form of thought and 
awareness. A man cannot really understand what it is 
to think scientifically unless he not only knows that 
evidence must be found for assumptions, but knows also 
what counts as evidence and cares that it should be 
found. (25)
Similarily David Kamlyn objects to the characterization of 
school subjects as if they available in some kind of platonic 
realm. He states:
There is an inclination, I believe to think that there 
exists objectively something called, to take one example, 
mathematics, and that it is the aim of education to
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bring the learner to a confrontation with it. Subjects 
are, on the account ideal identities available for 
contemplation. (26).
This, however, betrays a quite erroneous conception of school 
learning, according to Hamlyn, in that it is to suppose
... that learning consists merely in the acquisition of 
knowledge of a set of facts, the contemplation of a set 
of propositions. At its lowest level it reduces learn­
ing to simple rote - learning. But it cannot be any­
thing like that in fact. Even at the simplest level 
the acquisition of knowledge of facts goes hand and hand 
with understanding. Even in rote - learning it is 
essential to understand what is going on, and in higher 
forms of learning is much more important still. (27)
3. Implications for Classroom Pedagogy.
It is clear that this new epistemology, as suggested by such 
people as Bruner, will place different constraints upon 
pedagogy, the way knowledge is taught, and therefore our view 
of learning. School knowledge is thereby not something that 
can be presented in a packaged form, that is laid out in front 
of the learner as a static reality to be acquired, as is implied 
in the behavioural/realist view of learning. The behaviourists 
see learning as a programme of activities designed to promote 
certain ends. This is especially the essence of the now 
defunct programmed learning movement (Ref. D. P. Ausabel, 1S78T - 
p. 303 regarding the decline of programmed learning). And it 
has been carried into the objectives movement by many (e.g.
Tyler (1949 ) an<3 in a very precise form is illustrated by 
R.M. Gagne’, (1967),
A curriculum is a series of content units arranged in 
such a way that the learning of each unit may be 
accomplished as a single act, provided that the cap­
abilities described by specified prior units (in the
80
A i.
P r o f e s s o r  R. M. Gagne o f  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C a l i f o r n i a  i s  a
m a jo r  f o r c e  i n  t h e  gu ided  l e a r n i n g  a p p r o a c h .  His  a n a l y s i s  o f
29The C o n d i t i o n s  o f  L e a r n i n g  i s  one o f  t h e  f i n e s t  contemp­
o r a r y  s t a t e m e n t s  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  gu ided  l e a r n i n g  and 
i n s t r u c t i o n .
P o r  Gagne t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  i n s t r u c t i o n  a r e  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  
They a r e  b e h a v i o u r a l  p r o d u c t s  t h a t  can be s p e c i f i e d  i n  o p e r a t ­
i o n a l  t e r m s .  S u b s e q u e n t l y  t h e y  can  be t a s k  a n a l y z e d ;  t h e n  t h e y  
can  be t a u g h t .  Gagne" would s u b s c r i b e  t o  t h e  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  
p s y c h o l o g y  h a s  b e e n  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  s u g g e s t i n g  ways o f  t e a c h i n g  
o n ly  when o b j e c t i v e s  have b e e n  made o p e r a t i o n a l l y  c l e a r .  When 
o b j e c t i v e s  a r e  n o t  c l e a r l y  s t a t e d ,  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i s t  can  be o f  
l i t t l e  a s s i s t a n c e .  He i n s i s t s  on o b j e c t i v e s  c l e a r l y  s t a t e d  i n  
b e h a v i o u r a l  t e r m s .
P o r  Gagne", l e a r n i n g  i s  t h e  g o a l .  How a b e h a v i o u r  or 
c a p a b i l i t y  i s  l e a r n e d  i s  a f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  t a s k .  I t  may be by 
d i s c o v e r y ,  by gu ided  t e a c h i n g ,  by p r a c t i c e ,  by d r i l l ,  or  by 
r e v i e w .  The t o t a l  e m p h a s is  i s  upon t h e  l e a r n i n g  and i t  i s  
i r r e l e v a n t  how i t  i s  b r o u g h t  a b o u t .
I n  t h e  B r u n e r i a n  e p i s t e m o l o g y , how ever ,  t h e  method i s  
c r u c i a l ,  and i t  must u l t i m a t e l y  be l e a r n i n g  by d i s c o v e r y .  I n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  B r u n e r ' s  v iew  o f  t h e  l e a r n i n g  p r o c e s s  E s l a n d  w r i t e s :
The c h i l d  ' d i s c o v e r s '  c l a i m s  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  d a t a  which 
a r e  r e l e v a n t  t o  h i s  nomos and i s  en c o u ra g e d  t o  make 
them t h e  n u c l e i  around w h ich  f u t u r e  knowledge can
s e q u e n c e )  h a v e  a l r e a d y  b e e n  m a s t e r e d  b y  t h e  l e a r n e r  ( 2 8 )
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d e v e l o p .  He i s  t h e r e b y  made s e l f - r e g u l a t i v e  i n  t h a t  
he a c t i v e l y  c o n t r o l s  h i s  s e q u e n c e  o f  e x p e r i e n c e .  T h i s  
i s  t h e  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  o p t im ism  c a o n t a i n e d  i n  B r u n e r ' s  
w e l l -k n o w n  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  ' a n y  s u b j e c t  can  be t a u g h t  
e f f e c t i v e l y  i n  some i n t e l l e c t u a l l y  h o n e s t  form  t o  any 
c h i l d  a t  any s t a g e  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t ' .  The t e a c h e r  a s  a 
g u i d i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t  o t h e r  i n d u c e s  th e  c h i l d  t o  r e f l e c t  
on t h e  e m erg in g  l o g i c ,  and t o  u s e  i t  a s  a g e n e r a l i z i n g  
b a s e  f o r  a c q u i r i n g  f u t u r e  know led ge .  B e c a u s e  t h e  a r e a  
o f  s o c i a l l y - a p p r o v e d  knowledge i s  a l l o w e d  t o  be d i v e r s e  
and open -  ended,  i t  i s  e x p e c t e d  a s  a m a t t e r  o f  c o u r s e  
t h a t  t h e  p u p i l  w i l l  be a b l e  t o  f i n d  some c o g n i t i v e  
a t t a c h m e n t  b e tw e en  h i m s e l f  and h i s  s c h o o l  p r o j e c t s ;  
he i s  t h e r e f o r e ,  e x p e c t e d  t o  become c o m m it te d . ( 3 0 )
W hile  f o r  Gagne and t h e  b e h a v i o u r i s t  v ie w  g e n e r a l l y ,  
l e a r n i n g  i s  a c a r e f u l l y  guided t o u r  o f  a p r e - a r r a n g e d  
i n s t r u c t i o n a l  programme. The c h i l d  may work w i th  programmed 
m a t e r i a l  or  a programmed t e a c h e r  (one who f o l l o w s  e x p l i c i t l y  
a s t e p  by s t e p  g u i d e ) .  B u t  t h e  c h i l d  u l t i m a t e l y  f o l l o w s  a 
s e q u e n c e  d e t e r m in e d  by t h e  programme.
F o r  B r u n e r  much l e s s  s y s t e m  or  o r d e r  i s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  
th e  p a c k a g e .  I n  g e n e r a l  B r u n e r  i n s i s t s  upon th e  c h i l d  
m a n i p u l a t i n g  m a t e r i a l s  and d e a l i n g  w i t h  c o n t r a s t s  and i n c o n ­
g r u i t i e s  and c o n t r a s t s ,  B r u n e r  h op e s  t h a t  t h e  c h i l d ,  b e c a u s e  
o f  h i s  d i s c o m f o r t ,  w i l l  t r y  and s o l v e  t h i s  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m ,  
by making some d i s c o v e r y  ( c o g n i t i v e  r e s t r u c t u r i n g ) .  T h i s  
d i s c o v e r y  can  t a k e  t h e  fo rm  o f  a new s y n t h e s i s  or  a new 
d e s t i n c t i o n .
P i a g e t ‘S  u t i l i z e s  v e r y  much th e  same i n c o n g r u i t y  n o t i o n  
n o t i o n  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  t h e  d ev e lo p m en t  o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e .  I n  
h i s  s y s t e m ,  t h e  c h i l d  comes a t  b i r t h  w i th  c e r t a i n  s e n s o r i  -  
motor c o - o r d i n a t i o n s  w h ich  he c a l l s  s c h e m a t a . V a r i a t i o n s  i n  
s t i m u l u s  s i t u a t i o n s  c a l l  f o r  a d a p t i v e  accom m odations
or c h a n g e s  i n  t h e s e  schem ata  w h ich  c h a n g e s  a r e  a s s i m i l a t e d  or  
or  s t o r e d  a s  r e s i d u e s .  I n  P i a g e t ’ s t h e o r y  t h e  c h i l d ' s  a c t i v e  
c o n c e p t i o n s  o f  r e a l i t y  ( s p a c e ,  t i m e ,  and number) a r e  schem ata  
w hich  d e v e lo p  t h r o u g h  a c o n t i n u o u s  p r o c e s s  o f  accom modation 
and a s s i m i l a t i o n  and become f i x e d  or  s t a t i c  on ly  when th e  
c h i l d ' s  s ch em a ta  come t o  c o r r e s p o n d  so w e l l  w i th  r e a l i t y  t h a t  
no f u r t h e r  acco m m o dat io n s  a r e  r e q u i r e d .
As s i m i l a r  c o n c e p t  t o  th e  B r u n e r i a n / P i a g e t i a n  n o t i o n  .
a p p e a r s  i n  t h e  w r i t i n g s  o f  a number o f  o t h e r  p s y c h o l o g i s t s ,  f o r
exam p le .  L .  P e s t i n g e r  and G. A. K e l l y .  F e s t i n g e r  h a s  w r i t t e n
32a book e n t i t l e d  A T h eo ry  o f  C o g n i t i v e  D i s s o n a n c e  i n  which 
he shows t h a t  a d i s c r e p a n c y  b e tw e en  b e l i e f  a b o u t  a s i t u a t i o n  
and p e r c e p t i o n  o f  t h a t  s i t u a t i o n  a c t s  l i k e  a d r i v e .  The s u b j e c t  
a c t s  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  d i s s o n a n c e  by e i t h e r  w i th d r a w in g  f ro m  th e  
i n c r e d i b l e  s i t u a t i o n  or  by c h a n g in g  h i s  b e l i e f s .  S i m i l a r l y  
K e l l y ' s  p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l  p s y c h o l o g y  o f  P e r s o n a l  C o n s t r u c t s  
makes c e n t r a l  u s e  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e
When a p e r s o n ' s  c o n s t r u c t i o n  f a i l  t o  p r e d i c t  e v e n t s ,
t h i s  i s  d i s t u r b i n g ,  even a n x i e t y  p ro d u c in g ,"  and i t  
m o t i v a t e s  some k i n d  o f  c h a n g e . . .  . ( 3 4 )
T h i s  d i s s o n a n c e  -  c o n f l i c t  n o t i o n  h a s  i m p o r t a n t  i m p l i c a t ­
i o n s  f o r  c l a s s r o o m  m o t i v a t i o n .  When a young l e a r n e r  i s  c o n f r o n t e d  
w i t h  two c o n f l i c t i n g  p i e c e s  o f  e v i d e n c e  or  c e r t a i n  i l l o g i c a l i t i e s  
jLn h i s  t h o u g h t ,  he i s  c h a l l e n g e d  t o  s o l v e  t h e  pro b lem  by 
p u r s u i n g  i t  f u r t h e r :  i t  t h e r e b y  h a s  a: m o t i v a t i n g ,  e f f e c t .  F u r t h e r ­
more t h e  m o t i v a t i n g  e f f e c t  i s  i n t r i n s i c  t o  t h e  o rg a n is m .
J . McV,. Hunt states,
T h i s  i n c o n g r u i t y  -  d i s s o n a n c e  p r i n c i p l e  makes b o t h  
m o t i v a t i o n  and r e i n f o r c e m e n t  i n t r i n s i c  t o  th e  
o r g a n is m s  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  i t  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  i n t r i n s i c ,  
i f  you w i l l ,  t o  t h e  o r g a n is m s  i n f o r m a t i o n  -  p r o c e s ­
s i n g .  I t  i s  a s  i f  t h e  o r g a n is m  o p e r a t e d  l i k e  an 
e r r o r  -  a c t u a t e d ,  f e e d b a c k . . s y s t e m  where th e  e r r o r  
i s  d e r i v e d  f ro m  d i s c r e p a n c y  b e tw e e n  r e c e p t o r  -  
im p u ts  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  and t h e  r e s i d u e s  o f  p a s t  
e x p e r i e n c e  w h i c h j e e r v e  a s  a b a s i s  f o r  a n t i c i p a t i n g  
t h e  f u t u r e .  ( 3 5 )
I n t r i n s i c  m o t i v a t i o n  may be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  fro m  e x t r i n s i c  
m o t i v a t i o n  i n  t h a t  w h e r e a s  t h e  l a t t e r  depends upon reward 
e x t r a n e o u s  t o  t h e  l e a r n i n g  p r o c e s s ,  a reward o f t e n  s a t i f y i n g  
some need c o n d i t i o n ,  t h e  f o r m e r  depends u p o n . f a c t o r s  h i n g i n g  
on h arm on iou s  or  d i s s o n a n t  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  l e a r n i n g  p r o c e s s  
f o r  example t h e  n o t i o n  o f  p e r c e p t u a l  c o n f l i c t  or  c o g n i t i v e  
i m b a l a n c e .  Reward i n  t h i s  s y s t e m  i s  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
th o u g h t  p r o c e s s e s  i n v o l v e d :  s a t i f a c t i o n  i n  s o l v i n g  a p r o b le m
or  r e s o l v i n g  a c o n f l i c t  i s  r e w a r d i n g  t o  t h e  l e a r n e r .  D. E .  
B e r l y n e ^  i n  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  i n t r i n s i c  m o t i v a t i o n  i n t r o d u c e s  
t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  1e p i s t e m i c  c u r i o s i t y 1 t o  r e f e r  t o  knowledge 
s e e k i n g  b e h a v i o u r  i n c l u d i n g  q u e s t i o n i n g ,  o b s e r v a t i o n ,  p r o b le m ­
s o l v i n g .  E p i s t e m i c  c u r i o s i t y  t h e n  i s  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  p u r s u i n g  
knowledge f o r  i t s  own s a k e  r a t h e r  t h a n  f o r  any reward e x t r a n ­
eous t o  i t .  C l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  w i t h  t h i s  n o t i o n ,  i n  B e r l y n e ' s  
schema, i s  c o n c e p t u a l  c o n f l i c t  i n c l u d i n g  p e r p l e x i t y ,  d o u b t ,  
c o n t r a d i c t i o n  and c o n c e p t u a l  i n c o n g r u i t y .  G o f e r  and Appley 
s t a t e  :
B e r l y n e  h a s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  s e e k i n g  knowledge a r i s e s  
b e c a u s e  o f  c o n c e p t u a l  c o n f l i c t s  or  i n c o n g r u i t é s .  ( 3 7 )
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E p t i s t e m i c  or  e x p l o r a t o r y  b e h a v i o u r  c o n s i s t s  o f  c o l l e c t i n g  
i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  r e d u c e  u n c e r t a i n t y  -  t h u s  th e  l e a r n e r  i s  m o t i ­
v a t e d  t o  d i s c o v e r  new i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  h i m s e l f .
T h i s  i s  an i n t e r e s t i n g  and p l a u s i b l e  c o n c e p t  o f  m o t i v a t i o n :  
i t  s e e s  th e  l e a r n e r  a s  an a c t i v e ,  e x p l o r i n g  a g e n t  who p u r p o s e ­
f u l l y  s e e k s  knowledge f o r  i t s  own s a k e .  V/hat he l e a r n s  i s  not  
d e v a lu e d  by t h e  e x t r a n e o u s  reward o f f e r e d  by th e  S -  R p a t t e r n .  
M o r e o v e r ,  he i s  n o t  l e a r n i n g  r e s p o n s e s  t o  somebody e l s e ' s  
q u e s t i o n s  or  p r o b l e m s ,  b u t  i s  r e c o g n i z i n g  p ro b lem s f o r  h i m s e l f  
and s o l v i n g  them f o r  t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  g e t t i n g  t o  know more 
and making s e n s e  out o f  a c c u m u la te d  e x p e r i e n c e s .
J .  McV. Hunt i n  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  i n t r i n s i c  m o t i v a t i o n  i n  
young c h i l d r e n ,  a t t a c h e s  g r e a t  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  c o m p l e x i t y  i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  c h i l d r e n ' s  i n t e r e s t s  and c u r i o s i t y .  I n  h i s  v ie w ,  
a bo red  c h i l d  i s  one f o r  whom t h e r e  i s  t o o  l i t t l e  c o m p l e x i t y  
i n  h i s  e n v i r o n m e n t .  J u s t  a s  a young baby  w i l l  c e a s e  t o  pay 
a t t e n t i o n  t o  a v e r y  s i m i l a r  p a t t e r n  and become h a b i t u a t e d  t o  
i t ,  a s  an o l d e r  c h i l d  w i l l  c e a s e  t o  show i n t e r e s t  i n  a s k i l l  
he h as  l e a r n t  u n l e s s  i t  i n c r e a s e s  i n  c o m p l e x i t y .  McV. Hunt 
s t a t e s :
The phenomenon o f  h a b i t u a t i o n  pays  an i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  
i n  th e  d e v e lo p m en t  o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t  i n  th e  n o v e l  and 
more co m p lex .  One can o b s e r v e  t h i s  v e r y  c l e a r l y  i n  
t h e  develo pm ent  o f  an i n f a n t ;  one can  se e  i t  a l l  
th r o u g h  l i f e .  T h i s  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  n o v e l ,  th e  new 
and more complex  i s  r e a l l y  a k in d  o f  c o r o l l a r y  o f  
t h e  h a b i t u a t i o n  p r o c e s s .  R e p e a te d  e n c o u n t e r s  w i t h  
p a t t e r n s  l e a d  f i r s t  t o  r e c o g n i t i o n  and t h e n  t o  b o r e ­
dom. Once t h i s  h a s  o c c u r r e d  i t  i s  t h e  new t h a t  
becomes i n t e r e s t i n g  ( 3 8 )
I n  p l a n n i n g  work f o r  c h i l d r e n  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  what i s  s u r ­
p r i z i n g  or  complex f o r  one c h i l d  w i l l  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  evoke 
t h e  same r e s p o n s e  i n  a n o t h e r ;  i f  s u r p r i z e  i s  t o  work a s  a
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m o t i v a t i o n  d e v i c e ,  e a c h  i n d i v i d u a l  c h i l d ' s  s t a g e  o f  c o n c e p t u a l  
d ev e lo p m en t  must be c o n s i d e r e d .  The p l a n n i n g  o f  work must be 
l a r g e l y  on an i n d i v i d u a l  or  s m a l l  group b a s i s .  I t  i s  i n t e r e s t ­
i n g  t o  n o t e  t h a t  McV. Hunt s u g g e s t s  t h a t  some c h i l d r e n  i n  t h e  
c l a s s  may a c t  a s  c o m p l e x i t y  models  f o r  o t h e r s .  He s t a t e s :
V ery  l i t t l e  r e s e a r c h  h a s  b e e n  done on t h e  s e a r c h  f o r  
c o m p l e x i t y  a s  a p r i n c i p l e  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  d e v e l o p ­
ment.  Y e t ,  a s  I  s e e  i t ,  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  i s  t h e  b a s i s  
upon w hich  one c a n  m o t i v a t e  a c o n t i n u o u s  p r o c e s s  o f  
l e a r n i n g .  I n  f a c t  i t  seems t o  me t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  what 
F r o e b e l  c a l l e d  'g r o w t h  m o t i v a t i o n "  and what J o h n  Dewey 
a l s o  r e f e r r e d  t o  by t h i s  t e r m .  The c o m p l e x i t y  o f  t h e  
a c t i o n  and b e h a v i o u r  o f  a n o t h e r  c h i l d  a s  a model f o r  
i m i t a t i o n  i s  an i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  c h i l d ' s  i n t e r e s t s  
i n  d e v e l o p i n g  h i s  own c o m p e te n ce .  As an i n f a n t  a r r i v e s  
a t  a g i v e n  s t a g e  where he can  p e r f o r m  a g i v e n  k in d  o f  
a c t i o n ,  t h e n  a somewhat more com plex  model o f  t h a t  
a c t i o n  a p p e a l s  t o  h i s  i n t e r e s t .  B u t  t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  
o f  t h e  n e x t  l e v e l  o f  i n c r e a s e d  c o m p l e x i t y  r e q u i r e s  a 
n i c e  ju d g e m e n t .  When t h e  i n c r e a s e  >is t o o  g r e a t ,  t h e  
c h i l d ' s  i n c r e a s e d  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  model becomes a b a s i s  
f o r  f r u s t r a t i o n  ( 3 9 )
I m p l i c i t  i n  t h e  argum ent  f o r  i n t r i n s i c  m o t i v a t i o n  i s  th e  
a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  g r e a t e r  v a l u e  i n  s e e k i n g  knowledge or  
p u r s u i n g  i n t e r e s t s  f o r  t h e i r  own sa k e  r a t h e r  t h a n  f o r  any 
e x t r a n e o u s  rew a rd .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  D. P .  A u s u b e l  s t a t e s :
I t  i s ,  a t  l e a s t  p o t e n t i a l l y  t h e  most i m p o r t a n t  k in d  o f  
m o t i v a t i o n  i n  t h e  c l a s s r o o m .  ( 4 0 )
S i m i l a r l y  R. S.  P e t e r s  s u g g e s t s  th a  i n t r i n s i c  m o t i v a t i o n  must 
be a c e n t r a l  c o n c e r n  i n  t h e  u l t i m a t e  dev e lo p m en t  o f  an ' ed u c a te d  
p e r s o n ' .  He w r i t e s :
The aim o f  t h e  e d u c a t o r  i s  t o  g e t  o t h e r s  on th e  i n s i d e  
o f  such  w o r t h w h i le  a c t i v i t i e s  and fo r m s  o f  a w a r e n e s s  so 
t h a t  th e y  w i l l  e x p l o r e  them f o r  t h e  ends which a r e  
i n t r i n s i c  t o  them. ( 4 1 ) .
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T h i s  s e c t i o n  h as  v e r y  b r i e f l y  a t t e m p t e d  t o  p i n - p o i n t  some 
o f  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  B r u n e r i a n / p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l  p e r ­
s p e c t i v e  f o r  c l a s s r o o m  1 pedagogy.  S t a t e s  o f  knov/ing a s  
d i s t i n c t  f ro m  mere p a ck a g e d  k n o w led g e ,  c o g i i t i v e  c o n f l i c t  and 
i n t r i n s i c  m o t i v a t i o n  a r e  some o f  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  t h i s  
e p i s t e m o l o g y  f o r  c l a s s r o o m  p edagogy.
I n  c o n c l u d i n g  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  on i n t r i n s i c  m o t i v a t i o n  a 
few re m a rk s  a r e  n e c e s s a r y .  The d i s c u s s i o n  o f  i n t r i n s i c  
m o t i v a t i o n  i s  n o t  meant t o  be t o t a l l y  i d e a l i s t i c  and s u g g e s t s  
t h a t  e d u c a t i o n  can  be c a r r i e d  on i n  an  i d e a l  e n v iro n m en t  where 
t h e  t e a c h e r  ca n  r e l y  upon h i s  p u p i l s  b e i n g  ' i n t r i n s i c a l l y  
m o t i v a t e d '  on a p erm anent  b a s i s »  Such a  v iew would be u n r e a l .  
The f o l l w o i n g  r e m a r k s ,  w h ich  c o n t a i n  a t e a c h e r ' s  t h o u g h t s  
a b o u t  t h e  v a l u e  o f  i n t r i n s i c  m o t i v a t i o n ,  i l l u s t r a t e  some o f  
th e  p r o b le m s  r e g a r d i n g  i t  i n  t h e  e v e r y  day r e a l i t y  o f  t h e  
c l a s s r o o m :
I  have re a d  a g r e a t  d e a l  a b o u t  t h e  v a l u e  o f  i n v o l v i n g  
c h i l r a n  by a p p e a l i n g  t o  i n t r i n s i c  m o t i v e s .  I t  sounds 
i n t r i g u i n g ,  b u t  I  c a n n o t  h e l p  b u t  f e e l  t h a t  i t  i s  i n  
c o n f l i c t  w i th  some o f  my e x p e r i e n c e s  a s  a t e a c h e r .
I  t e a c h  a h e t e r o g e n e o u s  c l a s s ;  t h a t  i s ,  a  few s t u d e n t s  
have a h i g h  l e v e l  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  a few a r e  a c a d e m i c a l l y  
d i s i n t e r e s t e d ,  and t h e  r e s t  a r e  somewhere i n  t h e  middle» 
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  I  have found t h a t  s t u d e n t s  resp o n d  t o  a 
s y s te m  o f  re w a rd s  -  i n c l u d i n g  g r a d e s ,  c o m p e d i t i v e  games,  
and h e l p f u l  comments and c r i t i c i s m s .  I t  i s  n o t  t h a t  
I  am unaware o f  some f a u l t s  o f  such  a s y s t e m ,  b u t  i t  
seems t o  be t r u e  t h a t  s t u d e n t s  become r a t h e r  d ep end ent  
on t h e i r  t e a c h e r s  and i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  r e l y  on i n t e r n a l  
m o t i v a t i o n .  (4-2)
T h ere  i s  l i t t l e  d o u b t ,  b u t  t h a t  t e a c h e r s  u se  and w i l l  have t o  
u s e  v a r i o u s  form s o f  e x t r i n s i c  m o t i v e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  g e t  p u p i l s  
l e a r n i n g .  W hile  t h e  t e a c h e r  may have t o  r e l y  on su ch  e x t r i n s i c
87
d e v i c e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  g e t  th e  l e a r n i n g  p r o c e s s  s t a r t e d ,  u l t i m ­
a t e l y  he must hope t h a t  e x t e r n a l  m o t i v e s  w i l l  g i v e  way t o  an 
i n c l i n a t i o n  on t h e  p a r t  o f  th e  p u p i l  t o  s tu d y  f o r  t h e  v a l u e s  
t h a t  t h e  v a r i o u s  l e a r n i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  h o ld  f o r  him. In d e e d  i t  
i s  a common e x p e r i e n c e  t h a t  i n t e r e s t  grows w i th  i n c r e a s i n g  
kn o w led ge ;  th e  more we know a b o u t  a t o p i c ,  th e  more our a t t e n t ­
i o n  i s  drawn t o  f e a t u r e s  we e i t h e r  a l r e a d y  r e c o g n i z e  or  o t h e r s  
we w is h  t o  know more a b o u t .  Gordon A l l p 5 r t . * s  c o n c e p t  o f  
f u n c t i o n a l  autonomy i s  r e l e v a n t  h e r e .  He s u g g e s t s  t h a t ,  w h i le  
an i n d i v i d u a l  may b e g i n  an a c t i v i t y  f o r  p u r e l y  i n s t r u m e n t a l  
p u r p o s e s  he may l a t e r  d e v e lo p  a d e s i r e  t o  p e r s i s t  i n  t h e  a c t i v i t y  
f o r  i t s  own s a k e .  I n  r e l a t i o n  t o  A l l p o r t ' s  schema,  Downey and 
K e l l y  s t a t e :
He ( A l l p o r t )  a r g u e s  t h a t  w h i l e  many a c t i v i t i e s  may 
o r i g i n a l l y  have s e r v e d  some o t h e r  m o t i v e ,  t h e i r  
p e r s i s t e n c e  s u g g e s t * s  t h a t  t h e y  have g a in e d  d r i v e  
v a l u e  o f  t h e i r  own -  t h a t  i s  t h e y  a r e  now in d e p e n d ­
e n t  o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  m o t i v e s .  ( 4 3 )
F u r t h e r  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  i n t r i n s i c  m o t i v e s  
t h e  same a u t h o r s ,  s t a t e :
Thus i t  seems p l a u s i b l e  t h a t  i f  a p u p i l  works hard  
a t  h i s  h i s t o r y  s a y ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  p a s s  h i s  e x a m i n a t i o n ,  
he w i l l  g a i n  an i n t e r e s t  i n  h i s t o r i c a l  knowledge 
and i n v e s t i g a t i o n  f o r  i t s  own sa k e  ( 4 4 )
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  e x t r i n s i c  m o t i v a t i o n  i t  should  
be s a i d  t h a t  i f  an  e d u c a t i o n a l  s y s te m  i s  t o t a l l y  dom inated  by 
e x t r i n s i c  re w a rd s  a s  a means o f  g e t t i n g  c h i l d r e n  t o  l e a r n ,  such 
a s i t u a t i o n  i s  m o r a l l y  d u b io u s .  E x t r i n s i c  rew ard s  a r e  a form 
o f  b r i b e  i n  t h a t  t h e y  can  c o n r o l  an i n d i v i d u a l s  b e h a v i o u r  a s  
i f  he had no c h o i c e  or  autonomy o f  h i s  own. I f  we a r e
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e d u c a t i n g  c h i l d r e n  and n o t  j u s t  t r a i n i n g ;  t h e n  a t o t a l  r e l i a n c e  
on e x t r i n s i c  m o t i v a t i o n  i s  q u e s t i o n a b l e .  T h i s  im m e d i a t e l y  
r a i s e s  q u e s t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  our own e d u c a t i o n a l  s y s t e m ,  where 
e x t r a n e o u s  s u c c e s s  a t  e x a m i n a t i o n  i s  t h e  m o t iv e  t h a t  i s  c o n s -  
t a n l y  b e i n g  r e l i e d  upon i n  our s c h o o l s  -  t h i s  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  
t r u e  a t  second l e v e l  where t h i s  w r i t e r  h a s  most e x p e r i e n c e .
I n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  p o i n t  P r o f e s s o r  Enda McDonagh 
h a s  rem ark ed :
I s  t h e  e d u c a t i o n a l  a c t i v i t y  b e i n g  d i r e c t e d  t o  i m p a r t  
i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  can be r e p r o d u c e d  a t  e x a m i n a t i o n s  
w i th  a v iew  t o  a q u a l i f i c a t i o n  f o r  a j o b ?  I f  i t  i s ,  
i t  ought t o  be  h o n e s t l y  a ck n o w le d g e d :  t h i s  would be
on t h e  way t o  some k in d  o f  e d u c a t i o n a l  r e a l i t y .  B u t  
i f  i t  i s ,  i t  i s  n o t  l e a r n i n g  how t o  be a human b e i n g .  
Of c o u r s e ,  l e a r n i n g  how t o  b ehave  a s  a human b e i n g  
i n c l u d e s  l e a r n i n g  a s k i l l  i n  o r d e r  t o  have a j o b ,  or  
f u n c t i o n  i n  s o c i e t y ;  b u t  t h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  p r im a ry  
g o a l  and s h o u ld  n o t  e n t i r e l y  d e c i d e  what i s  done i n  
t h e  c l a s s r o o m .  ( 4 5 ) .
S i m i l a r l y  R.  S .  P e t e r s  w r i t e s  a b o u t  some o f  t h e  i n a d e q u a c i e s  
o f  a t o t a l  r e l i a n c e  upon i n t r i n s i c  m o t i v e s  w i t h i n  th e  e d u c a t ­
i o n a l  c o n t e x t :
. . .  i n  t h e  m o t i v a t i o n a l  s p h e r e  s t u d e n t s  a r e  u n l i k e l y  
t o  d e v e lo p  a d e l i g h t  i n  d o i n g  t h i n g s  f o r  r e a s o n s  
i n t r i n s i c  t o  them i f  re w a rd s  and p u n is h m e n t s ,  meted 
out b o t h  by t h e  s c h o o l  and by a f i e r c e  e x a m i n a t i o n  
s y s t e m ,  p r o v i d e  t h e  s t a b l e  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  th e  d i s c i p l i n e  
o f  l e a r n i n g ;  f o r  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  i t s e l f  em bodies an 
a t t i t u d e  t o  c o n d u c t  w h ich  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  P i a g e t ' s  
f i r s t  s t a g e  o f  d e v e lo p m e n t .  ( 4 6 )
4 .  F u r t h e r  I m p l i c a t i o n s .
I n  c o n c l u d i n g  t h i s  d i s s e n t a t i o n  one f u r t h e r  i m p l i c a t i o n  
o f  th e  B r u n e r i a n / p h e n e m e n o l o g i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e  f o r  t h e  c l a s s ­
room w i l l  be ex a m in e d ,  namely d i s c o v e r y  l e a r n i n g .  The
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d i s c u s s i o n  o f  i t s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  w i l l  n e c e s s a r i l y  be v e r y  b r i e f  
-  in d e e d  t h e  whole  c o n c e p t  o f  d i s c o v e r y  l e a r n i n g  would r i g h t l y  
fo rm  an e n t i r e  d i s s e n t a t i o n  i n  i t s  own r i g h t .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  how b r i e f ,  t h a t  i t  s h o u ld  be 
examined f o r  two r e a s o n s ;  f i r s t l y  s i n c e  i t  h a s  f i g u r e d  so 
c e n t r a l l y  i n  th e  v iew  o f  l e a r n i n g  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  p a p e r ,  and 
s e c o n d l y  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  c r i t i c i s m s  a d v o c a t e d  a g a i n s t  t h i s  
method o f  l e a r n i n g  by su ch  p e o p l e  a s  R. P .  D earden  ( 1 9 6 7 )  and 
P .  H. H i r s t  and R. S .  P e t e r s  ( 1 9 7 0 )  and more r e c e n t l y  N. B e n n e t t .
I t  i s  Dewey who h a s  g i v e n  c l a s s i c  f o r m u l a t i o n  t o  t h e  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  d i s c o v e r y  or  p ro b le m  method o f  t e a c h i n g .
B r u n e r  h as  b r o u g h t  t h i s  e p i s t e m o l o g y  up t o  d a t e  and i t  h a s  b e en  
a d v o c a t e d  a s  t h e  method o f  t e a c h i n g  by t h e  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  
p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  t h e  p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s ,  P r e i r e ,  and such  c u r r i c u l u m  
p l a n n e r s  a s  E i s n e r  and S t e n h o u s e .  T h e i r  t h e s i s  h a v i n g  b ee n  
i n  t h e  form  o f  an  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  f a i t h  i n  t h e  p o w e r f u l  l e a r n i n g  
e f f e c t s  t h a t  come f ro m  p e r m i t t i n g  t h e  s t u d e n t  t o  put t h i n g s  
t o g e t h e r  f o r  h i m s e l f ,  t o  be h i s  own d i s c o v e r e r .  T h i s  method 
o f  t e a c h i n g  h a s  b e e n  a d v o c a t e d  a s  an  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  " c o p y "  
t h e o r y  o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e  and c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  t h e o r y  o f  t r u t h .
J e ro m e  B r u n e r ,  i n  an a r t i c l e  e n t i t l e d  "The A c t  o f  D i s c o v e r y "  
o u t l i n e s  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  fu n d a m e n t a l  d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw e en  e x p o s i t o r y  
t e a c h i n g  and t h e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  mode ( i . e .  d i s c o v e r y ) .
I n  t h e  f o r m e r ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  mode and 
p a ce  and s t y l e  o f  e x p o s i t i o n  a r e  p r i n c i p a l l y  d e te rm in e d  
by t h e  t e a c h e r  a s  e x p o s i t o r ;  t h e  s t u d e n t  i s  t h e  l i s t e n e r .
I f  I  can  put  t h e  m a t t e r  i n  te rm s  o f  s t r u c t u r a l  l i n g u i s t i c s ,  
t h e  sp e a k e b  h a s  a q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  s e t  o f  d e c i s i o n s  t o  
make th a n  t h e  l i s t e n e r :  th e  f o r m e r  h a s  a wide c h o i c e  o f
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o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  f o r  s t r u c t r i n g ,  be i t  a n t i c i p a t i n g  
p a r a g r a p h  c o n t e n t  w h i l e  th e  l i s t e n e r  i s  s t i l l  i n t e n t  
on t h e  w ords ,  he i s  m a n i p u l a t i n g  t h e  c o n t e n t  o f  th e  
m a t e r i a l  by v a r i o u s  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s ,  w h i l e  t h e  l i s t e n e r  
i s  q u i t e  unaware o f  t h e s e  i n t e r n a l  m a n i p u l a t i o n s .
I n  t h e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  mode, t h e  t e a c h e r  and t h e  s t u d e n t  
a r e  i n  a more c o o p e r a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
what i n  l i n g u i s t i c s  would be c a l l e d  " s p e a k e r ' s  d e c i s i o n s " .  
The s t u d e n t  i s  n o t  a b en ch  bound l i s t e n e r ,  b u t  i s  
t a k i n g  a p a r t  i n  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  and a t  t i m e s  may p l a y  
t h e  p r i n c i p a l  r o l e  i n  i t .  He w i l l  be aware o f  a l t e r ­
n a t i v e s  and may ev en  have an  " a s  i f "  a t t i t u d e  tow ard s  
t h e s e  an d ,  a s  he r e c e i v e s  i n f o r m a t i o n  he may e v a l u a t e  
i t  a s  i t  comes. One c a n n o t  d e s c r i b e  t h e  p r o c e s s  i n  
e i t h e r  mode w i t h  g r e a t  p r e c i s i o n  a s  t o  d e t a i l ,  b u t  I  
t h i n k  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  may s e r v e  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  what i s  
m eant.  ( 4 7 ) .
N e v i l l e  B e n n e t t ' s  book T e a c h i n g  S t y l e s  and P u n i l  P r o g r e s s  
s e t  i t s e l f  t h e  e x p l i c i t  t a s k  o f  d i s e n t a n g l i n g  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  
v a l u e s  o f  t h e s e  two t e a c h i n g  m ethods.  I t  s e t  out  t o  examine 
th e  r a n g e  o f  t e a c h i n g  s t y l e s  f ro m  t h e  f o r m a l ,  t e a c h e r  c e n t r e d ,  
c o n t r o l l e d  c l a s s r o o m  a t  one e x trem e  t o  t h e  i n f o r m a l ,  more open-  
p l a n ,  s t u d e n t  c e n t r e d  one a t  t h e  o t h e r ;  and i t  i n q u i r e s  i n t o  
th e  s t r e n g t h s  and w e a k n e s s e s  o f  e a c h .  Two s e t s  o f  q u e s t i o n s  
were p o s ed :  ( a )  Do d i f f e r e n t  t e a c h i n g  s t y l e s  d i f f e r e n t i a l l y  
a f f e c t  t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  and e m o t i o n a l  grow th o f  p u p i l s ?  ( b ) 
do d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  o f  p u p i l s  p e r f o r m  b e t t e r  u nder  c e r t a i n  
t e a c h i n g  s t y l e s  th a n  o t h e r s ?
The main f i n d i n g s  can  be summed up q u i c k l y .  The more 
f o r m a l  t h e  t e a c h i n g ,  t h e  more t im e  p u p i l s  spend w o rk in g  on th e  
s u b j e c t  m a t t e r  a t  hand.  And i n  th e  more f o r m a l  c l a s s r o o m s  
s t u d e n t s  improved c o n s i d e r a b l y  more i n  r e a d i n g  and a r i t h m e t i c  
s k i l l s  t h a n  t h e  l e s s  f o r m a l l y  t a u g h t .  F u r t h e r ,  and v e r y  
s i g n i f i c a n t  p u p i l s  i n  i n f o r m a l  did n o t  do any b e t t e r  on t h e i r  
c r e a t i v e  w r i t i n g  t h a n  t h e i r  more f o r m a l l y  i n s t r u c t e d  f e l l o w s o
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V/hat o f  p e r s o n a l i t y  and t e a c h i n g  s t y l e s ?  Most p u p i l  
" t y p e s "  p r o g r e s s  b e t t e r  u nder  more f o r m a l  t e a c h i n g .  And 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  i n s e c u r e  and n e u r o t i c  p u p i l :  he seems a b l e
t o  a t t e n d  t o  work b e t t e r ,  and h a r d e r ,  i n  a f o r m a l  s e t t i n g ,  
P a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  t h e  u n s t a b l e  c h i l d ,  t h e  i n f o r m a l  s e t t i n g  
seems t o  i n v i t e  t im e  w a s t i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  -  i n d e e d ,  t h e  "unm oti ­
v a t e d " ,  r a t h e r  n e u r o t i c  c h i l d ,  was found t o  work f o u r  t i m e s  
a s  much a t  h i s  s t u d i e s  i n  a f o r m a l  s e t t i n g  t h a n  i n  an i n f o r m a l  
one. I n t e r e s t i n g l y  enough,  t h e  i n f o r m a l  c l a s s  seems t o  i n c r e a s e  
f a v o u r a l b e  a t t i t u d e s  to w a rd s  s c h o o l  -  b u t  i t  a l s o  i n c r e a s e s  
a n x i e t y .  And f o r  t h e  " t i m i d "  p u p i l ,  t h e  i n f o r m a l  c l a s s r o o m  
b r i n g s  him out  s o c i a l l y ,  though i t  does  n o t  i n c r e a s e  t h e  q u a l i t y  
o f  h i s  work a s  much a s  t h e  f o r m a l  s e t t i n g  d o e s .
Summing up t h e  f i n d i n g s  o f  B e n n e t t ' s  work B r u n e r  w r i t e s :
I n f o r m a l  t e a c h i n g  seems t o  have h i n d e r e d  t h e  t r a n s ­
m i s s i o n  o f  l i t e r a c y  and numeracy. And i t  h as  n o t  
s u c c e e d e d  i n  c o m p e n s a t in g  f o r  t h i s  l o s s  by a l t e r i n g  
c r e a t i v i t y ,  or  by b u t t r e s s i n g  i n s e c u r e  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  
i n  any m e a s u r a b le  way -  sa v e  th r o u g h  i n c r e a s e d  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w i t h  s c h o o l .  B u t  a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  
i t  h a s  c r e a t e d  a n x i e t y  o v e r  u n s t r u c t u r e d n e s s .  
T e a c h e r s  r e p o r t ,  m o r e o v e r ,  t h a t  i n f o r m a l  t e a c h i n g  i s  
c o n s i d e r a b l y  more demanding th a n  f o r m a l  and ru ns  th e  
r i s k ,  when i t  m i s f i r e s ,  o f  f a i l i n g  t o  t e a c h  anybody 
a n y t h i n g .  I n  one t e a c h e r ' s  w ords ,  a f o r m a l  c l a s s  
i s  bound t o  t e a c h  somebody s o m e th in g .  ( 4 8 )
V/hat i s  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  such  f i n d i n g s  f o r  th e  c o n c e p t  
o f  d i s c o v e r y ?  .. I t . . w i l l  be a rg u ed  h e r e  t h a t ,  w h i l e  t h e s e  f i n d i n g s  
seem t o  l e n d  s u p p o r t  t o  t h o s e  v/ho a rg u e  a g a i n s t  t h e  d i s c o v e r y  
p h i l o s o p h y ,  i t  i s  a t  t h e  same t im e  i m p o r t a n t  t h a t  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  
sh o u ld  be i n t e r p r e t e d  w i t h  p r u d e n c e .  I n  i n t e r p r e t i n g  B e n n e t t ' s  
work i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t h a t  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  r a t i o n a l i s m  o f  th e
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progressive practicioners in the study should be explicitly 
understood.
The 1960's and early 1970's witnessed an era when the 
popularity of the progressive movement reached a high point.
The number of curriculum projects, both in the United States 
and Great Britain undertaken during this period using this 
methodological perspective, is an indication fo the popularity 
of the method. And the progressive / discovery method was 
adopted to a considerable degree in this country too., most 
explicitly through the new primary school curriculum. But it 
seems to this writer that there may have been an excessive 
degree of romanticism involved in the application of the dis­
covery methodology in the classroom; and that this romanticism 
led to a conceptually unsophisticated application of the 
discovery method, thereby doing an injustice to the discovery 
concept. Traditionally the discovery/ problem posing method 
of teaching has been romanticized with the result that its 
justification and role within the educational process has been 
very inadequately understood. Through excessive romanticization 
it has assumed a doctrinal position whereby, when applied in 
the classroom, the discovery mode is seen in an all - or - none 
fashion as the essence of the whole educational enterprize.
One can see such a doctrinal view of the problem posing method 
is an example quoted by Bennett:
The school is not merely a teaching shop, it must 
transmit values and attitudes. It is a community 
In which children learn to live first and fore- 
must as children and not as future adults. The 
school set out deliberately to devise the right 
environment for children to allow them to be them-
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selves, and to develop in a way and at a pace appro­
priate for them. It lays special stress on indivi­
dual discoveries, on first hand experience, and on 
opportunities for creative work. It insists that 
knowledge does not fall into neatly separate com­
partments and that work and play are not opposite 
but complementary... Any practice which predeter­
mines the pattern and imposes it upon all is to be 
discouraged»(49)
In relation to such a view Bruner comments:
V/hat about spelling? The inexorble constraints of 
simultaneous equations? The structure of tragedy, 
or the contrasting balance of human myth? Are these 
to be banned? (50)
A further and more fundamental problem of an excessive 
reliance on the discovery concept must be examined. It is the 
fallacy of assuming that the child can achieve the ultimate 
aims of education self-directed from the start. The critical 
role of the adult as tutor is thereby ignored. However, com­
mon sense and technical enquiry are finally catching up with 
such romantic excesses. Such an outlook either explicitly or 
implicitly is embracing an extreme rationalist outlook. And 
it is this view of self-discovery that Chomsky has recently 
championed in relation to language learning and acquisition. 
Based upon his "innateness hypothesis", it was thought that 
language was self-discovered and need not be taught. However,
it is now realized that the mother and her reactions are vital
51and critical for language acquisition.
Professor D. W. Hamlyn in an article entitled "Human 
Learning" has dealt comprehensively with the problems of an 
excessive reliance on the rationalist position by Chomsk y.
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Chomsky has postulated an innate language faculty because it 
is for him inconceivalbe that the child should acquire fimil- 
arity with the idea of language merely from the noises that 
he hears from other people when they use language. But Hamlyn 
states, that
this account of the matter not only presupposes the 
view of the child as a little adult having to deal 
with a problem it also assumes that the child does 
it alone and ex nihilo, except what it is born with. (52)
Hamlyn believes that the child because of the essential 
immaturity of his intellect must be put in the way of things 
by a guiding adult. He writes:
The child has to be put in the way of things that will 
satisfy (his) interests; he cannot find them for himself, 
since he can have no conception of what will satisfy 
them or even of what it is for something to do so. ...
In humans there have to be some instinctive patterns of 
behaviour, e.g. sucking, but so much depends on what the 
mother puts the child in the way of. Equally much depends 
on such things as expression of love and affection and 
on the rapport that is normally set up between parent and 
child. Thus the child is not a solitary but immature 
consciousness trying to make sense of a mass of data which 
come before it in the light of certain mysterious prin­
ciples with which it is born. (53)
Hamlyn thereby pinpoints the crucial role of the adult 
tutor in the intellectual and social development of the child. 
Further support for this view has recently come from Bruner:
Early connection with a supporting world begins to emerge 
as a leitmotif for the development of later self-determin­
ation. And indeed, one of the central issues is to assure 
the dispossessed that this connection is not destroyed 
by isolating alienation.
Let me end with an example from research on the pre­
school young, for it illustrates the point. One of the 
known ways of increasing the young child's capacity to 
concentrate attention over longer periods of time is to 
have adults close by who serve as "scaffold" for the child,
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shielding him from distraction, and permitting him 
to get over the rough places that would put him off.
Once the child has experienced these protected, deeper 
forays into the world, he will increasingly prolong 
his attention on his, own, knowing what to expect.
And having done so, he will develop mastery on his own 
of matters that before, without his new - found powers 
would have thrown him. (54)
Bruner and Hamlyn therefore, both highlight the role of adult 
tutor in guiding the development of the young child. This 
helps to rid the progressive / discovery mode of the fallacy 
that the child can arrive at the educational terminus self­
directed from the start. This mode of teaching has tradit­
ionally been over romanticized and it is against a background
W,of much romanticization that Sennet's work should be evaluated. 
One would need to know the theoretical sufficiency of those 
who operationalized the discovery mode in his study before one 
could confidently conclude regarding the merits of different 
teaching methods. The essence of the discovery / problem 
solving mode is conceptually more sophisticated than mere 
unguided self-discovery.
How such a view of learning can be operationalized in 
practice is something that would require enormous study. It 
is not the purpose of this thesis to suggest how it may be 
operationalized, rather it has merely set out to suggest that 
the existentialist / phenomenological perspective on human 
learning - which places fundamental value on the discovery 
concept - is the most realistic way to view human learning.
The advocacy of this position has been a fundamental one 
concerned with the nature of learning in an educational context.
96
Learning, it has been suggested, is true learning in so as 
far as the individual subjectively or personally makes the 
object of his learning his own. This view is being put forward 
as an alternative to the empiricist view which has dominated 
the study of human learning in the past. It has been suggested 
that the empiricist view and its behaviourist outgrowth, both 
imply a too mechanical view of the acquisition of knowledge, 
apart from other failings also highlighted; for they both imply 
that the effects of external stimulation are simply imprinted 
on the soul, the mind, the organism, or whatever it is.
A P P E N D I X
iAPPLNLIX
The purpose of this appendix is to suggest such psychological 
interpretations of school learning as suggested by Gagne, De 
Cecco,, Lovell and Lunzer are fundamentally behaviouristic in 
-orientation.
In relation to Gagne” the behaviourist omentation 
of his position can be seen from the manner in which' 
he defines 'learning1. For Gagne "learning is a change in 
human disposition or capability, which can be retained, and is 
not simply ascribable to the process of growth "(Gagne- 1970, p. 3). 
This is more acceptable than the usual behaviourist definition, 
which is content to equate learning with any change in behaviour. 
(Ref. Ch. 2 section 1 regarding the problems of seeing learning 
in terms of behaviour). However, at the same time Gagne's 
.definition remains essentially behaviouristic in that it sees 
learning taking place only when the indiviual can d_o something 
which he could not do before. "People do not learn in a general 
sense, but always in the sense of a change in behavior that can 
be described in terms of an observable type of human perfor­
mance". (Gagne” 1970, p. 237). In other words, he is primarily 
interested in capabilities and only secondarily concerned, if 
at all, with dispositions. Broadly speaking, capabilities are 
overt, measurable in terms of the skill and other cognitive 
attainments, whereas dispositions tend to be more covert and 
elusive, having to do with the way the individual feels. For 
the behaviourist, any elucidation of what happens when the 
individual learns has to be treated as a 'black box' problem
- i.e. as an external observer lie has to reckon with an iinput 
(stimulus), and output (response) and functioning process in 
between which is in the nature of things invisible (Ref. Ch. l).
Summing up Gagne's psychology, M. L. Bigge (1976, p. 169)
"s/considers Gagne as an electic behaviourist in that he draws 
from a number of different schools of psychology. But, Bigge 
writes:
His eclecticism, however, is centered upon behaviourism, 
somewhat loosely defined, and it contains only marginal 
overtones gained from the Gestalt - field family of 
learning theories - hence the caption "behaviouristic 
- electic psychology" by which we identify his position. 
In the development of his psychological position, along 
with his taking major contributions from members of 
the behaviouristic family, Gagne draws some minor con­
tributions from other psychological approaches.
De Ceccols psychology is also essentially behaviouristic. 
In his book The Psychology of Learning and Instruction: 
Educational Psychology (Englewood Cliffs, K. J. : Prentice Hall,
1968), p. 241, he identifies clearly with behaviourist psychology
"The chapter uses the language of the connectionist - 
reinforcement learning theories. Research based on 
these theories forms the major part of psychological 
knowledge. My choice of theory and of language merely 
reflects the opinion that connectionist - reinforce­
ment theories and vocabulary more than cognitive theories 
and vocabulary lend themselves to the explicit descrip­
tion of the conditions of learning and teaching. Those 
of us who view psychology as a natural science look 
to future research to resolve some of the issues between 
the learning theories.
Future evidence of his behaviourist orientationis his definition 
of learning, "Learning is a relatively permanent change in a 
behavioural tendency and is the result of reinforced practice"« 
(J. P. De Cecco,. 1968).
i i i
The influence of behaviourist psychology can be further 
seen in the writings of Lunzer and Lovell. For example, Lovell 
defines learning as "a change in behaviour which is more or 
less permanent in nature... (Educational Psychology and Children, 
K. Lovell: Hodder and Stoughton, London, 11th Ed., 1975: p. 122).
The behaviourist ocaentation of Lunzer is seen in his view 
of education, which he sees as being concerned with knowledge, 
skills, and attitudes that he call behaviours. He writes, 
’’education is concerned with the transmission of behaviour..." 
(Development in Learning - 2), (Eds) E.A. Lunzer and Morris 
J. F. , London: Staples, 1968, p. 4-43).
Chapter 1 of this thesis has explained why such views of 
educational learning are essentially behaviourist. Chapters 
2, 3, and 4 have evaluated Critically this conception of learn- 
‘ing and in so doing an alternative strategy has been proposed.
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